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This study investigates the extent to which international human rights law has influenced 
the law and practice of sub-Saharan African countries on the death penalty. The study is 
divided into five chapters with three chapters focusing on three major death penalty 
thematic areas: imposition of a death sentence, clemency and abolition. The three areas 
are important elements of the death penalty and are indispensable in the exploration of 
the subject. Imposition of a death sentence is important because it constitutes the start of 
the process of the use of the death penalty. Clemency, which provides reprieve in death 
penalty cases, is a vital connecting theme between the imposition of a death sentence and 
its implementation. Abolition is an indispensable theme as it deals with the legal 
prohibition of the death penalty.    
The study examines the influence of international human rights law in the context of the 
absence of an African regional human rights treaty on abolition, the silence of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)1 on the death penalty and the 
limited restrictions on the use of the death penalty in existing African human rights 
instruments. 
The fact that a country’s law or practice is consistent or aligns with international human 
rights law does not of itself prove that the latter has influenced the former. Therefore, in 
this study, ‘influence’ is taken to mean the discernible effect of international human rights 
law on sub-Saharan African countries to restrict the use or abolish the death penalty. The 
‘use of the death penalty’ is taken to mean either the imposition of a death sentence or the 
carrying out of execution, while abolition is taken to mean the legal prohibition of the 
death penalty. 
The study is not a country-by-country analysis of the current situation regarding the death 
penalty in sub-Saharan Africa, but an exploration of the human rights legal approaches 
                                                     
1
 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5. The African Charter was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into 
force on 21 October 1986, it currently has 53 States Parties. South Sudan is a signatory but not yet a party. 
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taken by certain African countries to restrict the use or abolish the death penalty. The 
scope of the study is limited to countries in sub-Saharan Africa2 because the region has 
the potential to completely abolish the death penalty.3 It focuses on the following 
countries, with reference to the three themes explored in the study: Benin, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia. These 
countries have been selected because of their developed jurisprudence on human rights 
and the death penalty; and are representative of the different sub-regions of sub-Saharan 
Africa. The study critically evaluates executive and legislative decisions and court 
judgments on the death penalty in the selected countries. Although the study focuses on 
those countries, reference will be made to examples and practices in other sub-Saharan 
African countries to support various arguments made in the exploration of the three 
themes.  
1.1   Review of academic literature on the death penalty in Africa 
 
Academic literature on the death penalty in Africa is limited. This study therefore seeks 
to make a contribution to existing literature by analysing the influence of international 
human rights law on the use and abolition of the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
There are two main books dealing with the global use of the death penalty: William 
Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2003) and Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A 
Worldwide Perspective (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2015). Both texts explore the 
global use of the death penalty but with limited focus on Africa. While Schabas’s work 
requires updating, the recent edition of Hood and Hoyle’s work is relatively up to date on 
global trends but still lacks an African perspective on the death penalty. 
 
Four main books deal with the death penalty in Africa: Lilian Chenwi, Towards the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights Perspective (Pretoria, Pretoria 
                                                     
2
 According to the UN, there are 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa; they exclude North Africa which is 
comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara. 
<https://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/africa.htm> assessed 20 June 2018.  
3
 Amnesty International (AI), Death Sentences and Executions 2017 (ACT 50/7955/2018). 
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University Law Press 2007); Andrew Novak, The Death Penalty in Africa: Foundations 
and Future Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan 2014);  Aime Muyoboke Karimunda, The 
Death Penalty in Africa: The Path Towards Abolition (Routledge 2016); and Andrew 
Novak, The African Challenge to the Global Death Penalty Abolition; International 
Human Rights Norms in Local Perspective (Intersentia 2016). Nowak’s latest work on 
the death penalty in Africa explores the African contribution to the global death penalty 
debates and lessons for the international death penalty abolition movement by using eight 
sub-Saharan African countries as case studies. Karimunda’s work discusses the historical 
and cultural background of the death penalty in Africa. Nowak’s earlier work examines 
the death penalty in Africa within a historical, cultural and political context, devoting 
only one chapter to the modern use of the death penalty in Africa and with very limited 
human rights perspective and analysis. Chenwi’s work on the death penalty in Africa 
relies on United Nations (UN) and African regional human rights instruments, national 
laws and court judgments to analyse an emerging international trend towards the abolition 
of the death penalty in the African context, with specific focus on history; the right to life 
and fair trial; and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
However, Chenwi’s work is about 11 years old and does not reflect the recent trends on 
the death penalty in Africa.  
 
In addition, there have been some journal articles written on the death penalty in Africa: 
Peter Norbert Bouckaert, ‘Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital 
Punishment in South Africa’ (1996) 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 287; Dirk van Zyl Smit, ‘The 
Death Penalty in Africa’ (2004) 4 AHRLJ 3; Lilian Chenwi, ‘Breaking New Ground: The 
Need for a Protocol to the African Charter on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa’ 
(2005) 5 AHRLJ 89; Audrey Boctor, ‘The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Rwanda’ 
(2009) 10 Hum Rights Rev 99; Andrew Nowak, ‘The Abolition of the Mandatory Death 
Penalty in Africa: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis’ (2012) Ind. Intl & Comp. L. 
Rev. 267; Lilian Chenwi, ‘Initiating Constructive Debate: Critical Reflection on the 
Death Penalty in Africa’ (2012) 38 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. 474 (2005); and Sigall 
Horovtiz, ‘International Criminal Courts in Action: The ICTR’s Effect on Death Penalty 




Bouckaert in his article examines the history of the death penalty in South Africa and 
highlights the process of abolition through judicial review. Van Zyl Smit’s article 
analyses the extent to which the death penalty is an issue to be concerned about in Africa, 
the restriction on the death penalty and how the restrictions can be strengthened. Chenwi’s 
earlier article addresses the necessity of an African treaty on the abolition of the death 
penalty considering the international human rights developments and trends towards the 
abolition of the death penalty. Boctor’s article appraises the process of abolishing the 
death penalty in Rwanda, emphasizing the political and legislative steps taken by the 
authorities in Rwanda in that regard, and the involvement of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Nowak’s article presents a comparative constitutional 
analysis of the abolition of the mandatory death penalty by the Constitutional Court of 
Malawi and the Court of Appeal of Kenya; however, the article requires updating 
considering recent judicial development in Kenya. Chenwi’s latest article considers the 
need for a constructive debate on the death penalty in Africa. Her article examines the 
African Commission’s stance on the death penalty and evaluates the use of the death 
penalty in Africa by focusing mainly on the possibility of relying on constitutional 
provisions on the right to life and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment to challenge the death penalty. Lastly, Horovtiz uses qualitative empirical 
research method in his article to indicate how the ICTR influenced the abolition of the 
death penalty in Rwanda and reflects on the impact of the abolition on national 
reconciliation.  
 
1.2   Structure and research methodology 
 
Chapter one is the introduction which lays the foundation of the thesis. It provides a 
review of academic literature on the death penalty in Africa, states the general plan and 
methodology of the study, highlights the origin of the death penalty in Africa, explains 
why the study matters, explores why the African Charter is silent on the death penalty, 
provides an overview of international human rights law on the death penalty, and traces 
the progress on the death penalty in the African regional human rights system. Chapter 
two analyses the influence international human rights law has had on certain countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In Chapter three the study explores clemency, which is the only legal 
option available after a death sentence has been confirmed by an appellate court, appeal 
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rights have been exhausted or following a lack of appeal. The chapter determines the 
extent to which international human rights law has influenced the use of the death penalty 
through the granting of clemency in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter four focuses on 
abolition, a theme which is key to the ultimate prohibition of the death penalty. The 
chapter demonstrates the extent to which international human rights law has influenced 
the abolition of the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter five, which is the 
concluding chapter, sums up the study by evaluating the extent to which international 
human rights law has influenced the use and abolition of the death penalty in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
The study adopts a doctrinal legal framework in its examination of the extent to which 
international human rights law has influenced the use and abolition of the death penalty 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The framework incorporates human rights arguments and a 
comparative approach in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. The study will analyse 
international human rights instruments, the decisions and statements of UN treaty bodies 
and African regional human rights instruments. The analysis for the thesis will be drawn 
from books, journal articles, reports of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), UN documents, relevant national laws and the 
decisions of national and international courts. The study is limited mostly to materials in 
English which have been published or are available online; some materials in French have 
been translated into English.  
1.3   Origins of the death penalty in Africa 
 
The use of death as a form of punishment in Africa dates back to pre-colonial times. 
Sorcery or witchcraft, wilful murder, treason and certain types of political offences were 
punished with the execution of the ‘guilty’ person.4 Over the years, some African legal 
experts have opined that the use of death to punish crimes in pre-colonial Africa did not 
constitute the death penalty. They appear to suggest that the use of the death penalty began 
with the advent of colonialism in Africa. Chenwi has argued that it is problematic to 
consider the pre-colonial practice as the death penalty because there is no strong evidence 
                                                     
4
 Taslim Elias, The nature of African customary law (Manchester University Press 1956) 260. 
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to indicate that the death penalty was institutionalised in pre-colonial African society.5 
She contends that the death penalty system as it exists today was introduced by the 
colonial powers and is not what was practised in pre-colonial times.6 In S v. Makwanyane 
and Another, Justice Sachs argued that the death penalty was not used, at least for murder, 
in pre-colonial African societies.7 Kinemo in his work on Tanzania’s penal policy has 
argued that hanging was not known to Africa and was introduced through colonialism.8 
These views portray the death penalty as an import of colonialism to Africa. In their 
assessment, those scholars appear not to consider the main element of the death penalty, 
which is the use of death by the authorities of a jurisdiction, as punishment for certain 
crimes. This element remains constant whether or not the authority is colonial. In fact, 
there is sufficient evidence to indicate that, even before the advent of colonialism, death 
was used as punishment for certain crimes in Africa.9 In pre-colonial North Africa, the 
death penalty was used against slaves who tried to escape or were disruptive,10 and in 
Ancient Egypt death sentences were imposed for murder, violation of tombs, treason and 
attempting to kill the Pharaoh.11 In pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa there are also 
examples of the use of the punishment. In Rwanda, death was used as punishment for 
incest and murder.12 The Akan people of Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, and the Ba-Mbala 
ethnic group of the Democratic Republic of Congo imposed death sentences for treason.13 
Among the Nandi people in East Africa, witchcraft was punished with death.14 The Bira 
                                                     
5
 Lilian Chenwi, Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights Perspective 




 S v. Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), paras 377-381.  
8
 Ross E.J. Kinemo, ‘Contemporary Tanzanian Penal Policy: A Critical Analysis’ (Naivasha: British 
Institute in East Africa) 23-24. 
9
 Elias (n 4); Andrew Novak, The Death Penalty in Africa: Foundations and Future Prospects (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2014) 9-23, Aime Muyoboke Karimunda, The Death Penalty in Africa: The Path Towards 
Abolition (Routledge 2016).  
10
 Norman Bennett, ‘Christian and Negro Slavery in Eighteenth Century North Africa’ (1960) 1 The Journal 
of African History 66,68,80. 
11
 Karimunda (n 9) 26-28. 
12
 Novak (n 9) 16. 
13
 Karimunda (n 9) 17. 
14
 Geoffrey S Snell, Nandi Customary Law (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau 1954) 77. 
13 
 
and Mangbetu ethnic groups of the DRC and the Baganda in Uganda imposed death 
sentences for adultery.15 The fact that the pre-colonial authorities in African societies used 
death as punishment in a manner and under a legal system different from the colonialists’ 
should not preclude these pre-colonial practices from being regarded as constituting the 
death penalty. In effect, the practices in both eras involved the imposition of death 
sentences and the carrying out of executions for crimes for which a person was adjudged 
guilty by the authorities of the time.  
1.4   The importance of this research 
 
While the origins of the death penalty in Africa may be subject to debate, its use in 
modern-day Africa cannot be denied. The death penalty remains entrenched in the laws 
of many sub-Saharan African countries. Of the 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa 21 
have abolished the death penalty for all crime.16 The remaining 28 countries, a majority 
(57 per cent), have not abolished the death penalty at all. The fact that the majority of 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa retain the death penalty in their laws is an issue which 
one should be concerned about. There are at least three reasons for this and why this 
research matters. First, the majority of countries in the world have abolished the death 
penalty for all crimes,17 yet the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa still retain the 
punishment in law contrary to international trends. Secondly, while people who commit 
serious crimes in 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are completely protected against the 
death penalty, those in the other 28 countries are not and could be deprived of their lives 
by law. This creates a kind of lottery with regard to respect for the right to life in sub-
Saharan Africa. Thirdly, as Van Zyl Smit has argued, the death penalty may be 
capriciously applied to people in Africa by the state.18 The resumption of executions by 
some countries in sub-Saharan Africa in recent times makes this argument no less valid 
                                                     
15
 Karimunda (n 9) 22-23 
16
 Amnesty International (AI), Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries as of March 2018 (ACT 
50/6665/2017); Associated Press, ‘Burkina Faso abolishes death penalty in new penal code’ AP 
(Ouagadougou, 31 May 2018) <https://www.apnews.com/15b6e4f6a4a54af29e74e4e3d45a7bb6> 
accessed 26 June 2018. Burkina Faso recently became the 21st country in sub-Saharan Africa to abolish the 
death penalty when Parliament adopted a new Penal Code on 31 May 2018 which excludes the use of the 
death penalty as a punishment for crimes. 
17
 AI (n 3) 5. 
18
 Dirk van Zyl Smit, ‘The death penalty in Africa’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 3. 
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and relevant today. In the last 7 years, countries like Botswana, Chad, Gambia and Nigeria 
have suddenly resumed executions of people sentenced to death after a period of not 
carrying out executions.19  
The African Charter, Africa’s main international human rights instrument, appears weak 
in addressing the highlighted concerns, despite expressly protecting the right to life. 
Article 4 provides: ‘Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to 
respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of 
this right.’20 However, the African Charter is completely silent on the death penalty. The 
reasons for this will now be considered, with reference to the Charter’s drafting history. 
1.4   The African charter and its silence on the death penalty 
  
The African Charter was born out of the desire of African States to establish a regional 
human rights instrument for Africa.21  The momentum that led to the eventual creation of 
the African Charter began in 1961 when an African Conference on the Rule of Law, 
comprising legal experts from across Africa, was organised by the International 
Commission of Jurist in Lagos, Nigeria.22 The Conference passed a resolution known as 
the Law of Lagos which declared the need to establish a mechanism for the protection of 
individuals.23 The resolution also called on African governments to adopt an African 
convention on human rights with a court and a commission, but unfortunately African 
governments at the time did not support the idea.24 In addition, in 1969, the UN in 
collaboration with the United Arab Emirates convened a seminar in Cairo, Egypt to study 
the feasibility of creating a regional human rights entity with an African mandate.25 In the 
decade that followed the Seminar, many other fora were facilitated across Africa to 
                                                     
19
 Amnesty International (AI), Death Sentences and Executions 2015 (ACT 50/3487/2016) 56-58; AI, 
Death Sentences and Executions 2016 (ACT 50/5740/2017) 36-38; AI, Death Sentences and Executions 




 Richard Gittleman, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’ (1982) 22:4 
Virginia Journal of International Law. 
22
 Ibid, 668. 
23
 International Commission of Jurist, African Conference on the Rule of Law, Lagos, Nigeria, Jan. 3-7, 
1961: A Report on the Proceedings of the Conference 11 (1961). 
24
 <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history/> accessed 27 December 2017. 
25
 UN Doc ST/TAO/HR/39. 
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discuss human rights protection mechanisms in Africa.26 
By 1979, the desire of African States to establish an African regional human rights 
instrument had become fully entrenched. In July of that year, during an Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) summit of African leaders in Monrovia, Liberia,27 the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Government of the OAU, through a resolution, requested the 
Secretary-General of the OAU to convene a committee of experts to draft an Africa 
regional human rights instrument.28 The resolution stated: 
The Assembly reaffirms the need for better international cooperation, respect for 
fundamental human rights and peoples’ rights and in particular the right to 
development ... The Assembly calls on the Secretary-General to: 
(b) organise as soon as possible, in an African capital, a restricted meeting of highly 
qualified experts to prepare a preliminary draft of an “African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights” providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote 
and protect human and peoples’ rights.29 
In implementation of the resolution, the Secretary-General convened a conference of 
twenty appointed African legal experts in Dakar, Senegal from 28 November to 8 
December 1979.The experts were headed by Honourable Judge Keba Mbaye, then 
President of the Supreme Court of Senegal. 30 The objective of the conference was to 
prepare a preliminary draft of the African human rights instrument based on an African 
legal philosophy which is responsive to African needs.31 Prior to the conference 
beginning, Judge Mbaye had produced a first draft of the African Charter (the Mbaye 
                                                     
26
 Gittleman (n 21) 671-672. 
27
 The OAU was the political union of all African States which was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia; it was replaced by the African Union on 26 May 2001. 
28
 Fatsah Ouguergouz, The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights:  A Comprehensive Agenda for 
Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy In Africa  (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003) 38-39; 
<http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/history/> accessed 27 December 2017. 
29
 Res. AHG/Dec.115 (XVI) Rev. 1 1979. 
30
 Germain Baricako, ‘Introductory Preface: The African Charter and African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights: The System in Practice 1986–2006 (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2008). 
31
 Gittleman (n 21) 668. 
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Draft) which served as ‘a working paper for the experts.’32 The Mbaye Draft was mainly 
drawn from the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)33 and the American Convention on Human Rights (American 
Covention).34 In the opinion of Judge Mbaye, those two instruments ‘contain provisions 
which could in substantial parts be applied to the peoples of Africa.’35 After 10 days of 
work the experts fulfilled their mandate by producing a preliminary draft of the African 
Charter (the Dakar Draft), containing a Preamble and 65 Articles and guided by the 
principle that the instrument should reflect the African conception of human rights.36 The 
Dakar Draft was reviewed by the OAU Ministerial Conference at two separate sessions,37 
before being adopted unanimously on 17 June 1981 at the 18th OAU Assembly of Heads 
of States and Government.38  
A number of scholars have written about the African Charter, its drafting history and 
analyzed its Articles, but have not highlighted the absence of the death penalty in their 
works.39 Three death penalty scholars have rightly identified that the African Charter is 
silent on the death penalty, but rather than trying to explain why, they have simply drawn 
                                                     
32
 Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1; it contained a Preamble 
and 63 Articles.  
33
 993 UNTS 3. The ICESCR was adopted on 16 December 1966 and came into force on 3 January 1976 
and currently as 168 States Parties. 
34
 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1. American Convention, OAS Treaty Series No 36 was adopted on 22 
November 1969 and entered into force on 18 July 1978. It currently has 23 States Parties, two countries – 





 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 1. 
37
 The first OAU Ministerial Conference, which comprised of African Ministers of Justice, met in Banjul, 
Gambia from 8 to 15 June 1980. The Ministerial conference was only able to review and approve 11 
Articles of the Dakar Draft. The second OAU Ministerial Conference was held in Banjul, Gambia from 7 
to 19 January 1980 where the review of the Dakar Draft was completed. 
38
 Ouguergouz (n 28) 47-48. 
39
 Gittleman (n 21); Ouguergouz (n 28); Baricako (n 32); Orji Umozurike, ‘The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights’ (1983) 77 The American Journal of International Law 902; H.B. Jallow, The Law of 
the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Victoria, 2007); E. Kodjo, 'The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' (1990) 11 Human Rights Law Journal 271; Orji Umozurike, The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1997); E. Kannyo, 'The Banjul 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and Political Background' in C. E. Welch Jr and R. I. 




various conclusions on how the Charter’s position on the death penalty may be interpreted 
from Article 4.40 In that regard, William Schabas and Lilian Chenwi have both argued 
that an objective analysis of Article 4 is required to determine the death penalty status of 
the African Charter, and that such an analysis reveals Article 4 as pointing towards 
abolition as the goal.41 They have further argued that that analysis should be done in light 
of Article 60 of the Charter which allows for the drawing of inspiration from international 
human rights law.42 In contrast, Etienne-Richard Mbaya has argued that Article 4 allows 
for the use of the death penalty as long as it is done in accordance with the law.43 He 
based his argument on the fact that Article 4 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life in 
the same way as Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),44 which allows for the use of the death penalty in limited circumstance.45 
Schabas has stated that a thorough answer cannot be provided to the question of the 
African Charter’s silence on the death penalty because of the paucity of available 
materials on its drafting history.46 This perhaps explains why Schabas made no reference 
to the Charter’s drafting history in his construction of Article 4. However, contrary to 
Schabas’ claim, the available materials on the drafting history do shed light on the reason 
for the African Charter’s silence on the death penalty. 
The Mbaye Draft, which was the working draft used by the Committee of Experts, 
contained provisions on the right to life and the death penalty. Article 17 stated: 
Every person has the right to have his life respected.  This right shall be protected 
by law and, in general, from the moment of his birth.  No one shall arbitrarily be 
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deprived of his life. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political 
offences or related common crimes. Every person condemned to death shall have 
the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be 
granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition 
is pending for decision by the competent authority.47 
The above provision echoes Article 4 of the American Convention and is evidence of 
Keba Mbaye’s claim that his draft was inspired by the provisions of the American 
Convention.48 Subsequently, however, following the work of the Committee of Experts, 
the ‘right to life’ provision in the Dakar Draft was significantly different from that 
contained in the Mbaye Draft. The provision in the Dakar Draft stated: ‘Human beings 
are sacred. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and to the physical 
and moral integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his right.’49 All 
references to the death penalty had been removed by the Committee of Experts and the 
paragraph had been reduced to just three sentences. Since the records of the Committee’s 
deliberations are not publicly available, the details of the removal of the death penalty 
provisions cannot be established. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Committee of 
Experts intentionally omitted references to the death penalty from the African Charter. 
Two factors can be advanced to explain their action. 
First, the Committee of Experts were determined that the African Charter should be 
original, and as such they refused simply to replicate or import death penalty provisions 
from other international instruments. Secondly, the death penalty was not a human rights 
priority in Africa at the time the Charter was drafted, so its inclusion was considered 
unnecessary.  
Support for these factors can be found in the principle that governed the drafting of the 
African Charter, which is expressed in the introductory statement of the Committee of 
Experts to the Dakar Draft: 
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It must be pointed out that the preliminary draft was guided by the principle that 
the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights should reflect the African 
conception of human rights.  It was not therefore necessary to copy simply and 
purely what was done in other regions or at world level.  The African Charter 
should take as a pattern the African philosophy of law and meet the needs of 
Africa. This idea led to some originality in the contents and presentation of the 
Charter.50 
This statement provides an illuminating insight into what influenced the drafting of the 
African Charter. In the words of Mr Edem Kodjo, the OAU Secretary-General, to 
‘distinguish the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights from the conventions 
already adopted in other regions.’51 At this point, the opening address to the Committee 
of Experts by Leopold Sedar Senghor, the then President of Senegal,  is worthy of 
mention as it laid down the philosophy and defined the governing principle which guided 
the work of the experts.52 President Senghor, among other things, had urged the experts 
as follows: 
As Africans, we shall neither copy, nor strive for originality, for the sake of 
originality. We must show imagination and effectiveness. We could get inspirations 
from our beautiful and positive traditions.  Therefore, you must keep constantly in 
mind our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa.53 
President Senghor had also emphasized that Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
peoples’ rights, and the duties of the individual were essential to a unique African human 
rights instrument.54 He stressed that if Africans were to develop for the future, they would 
need to assimilate without being assimilated, borrowing from the modern world only 
things that do not misrepresent African civilization and nature.55 With regard to human 
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rights, he urged the Experts to carefully avoid libertarian freedom, irresponsibility and 
immorality.56 It is therefore not surprising that the content of the Dakar Draft reflected 
the calls of President Senghor. 
In elaborating the first factor mentioned above, it is vital to emphasize one part of the 
governing principle which guided the drafting of the Africa Charter: ‘It was not therefore 
necessary to copy simply and purely what was done in other regions or at world level.’57 
As the death penalty provisions in the Mbaya Draft replicated those of the American 
Convention verbatim, it seems reasonable to conclude that retaining those provisions in 
the Dakar Draft would have conflicted with the governing principle to which the Experts 
had subscribed, hence their removal.  
On the second factor, in light of the governing principle, particularly the requirement that 
‘the African Charter should take as a pattern the African philosophy of law and meet the 
needs of Africa’, it would be fair to argue that regulating the use of the death penalty was 
not considered a human rights priority in Africa at the time. This is evident from the death 
penalty status of African countries in 1979, when the Charter was being drafted. At that 
time, no country in Africa had abolished the death penalty for all crimes.58 Having had 
the benefit of seeing the Mbaye Draft, the fact that the Committee of Experts had the 
opportunity of including provisions restricting the use of or even abolishing the death 
penalty in Article 4 yet did not do so gives credence to this argument.  
In the same context, it is important to note that when the Dakar Draft was reviewed by 
the OAU Ministerial Conference, the only change made to the wording of Article 4 was 
the replacement of ‘sacred’ with ‘inviolable’. No delegate raised concerns about the 
absence of a reference to the death penalty in an article providing for the right to life.59 
This indicates the unwillingness of African states to limit the use of the death penalty at 
a time very few countries in the world had completely abolished it60 and the ICCPR, the 
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binding UN instrument regulating the death penalty, had had relatively few States 
Parties.61 
1.5   An overview of international human rights law on the death penalty 
 
This section gives an overview of international human rights law on the death penalty. 
The overview is particularly important to establish a background to the key international 
human rights law instruments to which this study will refer. 
The right to life is protected under international human rights law. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted on 10 December 1948 by the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA),62 proclaims that ‘Everyone has the right to life’ and 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.63 The UDHR is not a treaty which states can sign or ratify. It is a milestone 
document which for the first time set out fundamental human rights to be universally 
protected.64 In addition, it is generally accepted as evidence of customary international 
law.65 The UDHR lays the foundation for the protection of the right to life under 
international human rights law but does not mention the death penalty. 
The first ever reference to the death penalty in international human rights law was in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR),66 which was the first international instrument to give effect to some of the rights 
stated in the UDHR and make them legally binding. The ECHR guarantees the right to 
life but makes the death penalty an exception to it. Article 2 of the ECHR states: 
‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 
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crime for which this penalty is provided by law’.  
In 1966, the ICCPR was adopted by the UNGA.67 Article 6(1) ICCPR states: ‘Every 
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’. The ICCPR effectively gives recognition to the 
death penalty, but its use is restricted. Article 6(2) ICCPR states: ‘In countries which have 
not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most 
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime…’.  
In 1989 the UNGA adopted the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty (ICCPR-OP2),68 which provides that ‘no one within the 
jurisdiction of a State Party shall be executed’ and commits each State Party to ‘take all 
necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction’.69 However, 
Article 2 allows States Parties to retain the death penalty in time of war if they make a 
reservation to that effect at the time of ratifying or acceding to the Protocol.70  
Three international treaties, with regional scope, provide for the abolition of the death 
penalty. Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 
adopted by the Council of Europe in 1982,71 provides for the abolition of the death penalty 
in peacetime. States Parties may retain the death penalty for crimes ‘in time of war or of 
imminent threat of war’.72 Any State Party to the ECHR can become a party to Protocol 
No. 6.73 Also, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the 
Death Penalty, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
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in 1990, provides for the total abolition of the death penalty but allows States Parties to 
retain the death penalty in wartime if they make a reservation to that effect at the time of 
ratifying or acceding to the Protocol.74 Any State Party to the American Convention can 
become a party to the Protocol.75 The particular weakness of Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR 
became evident in the years after its adoption. The fact that Protocol No. 6 did not abolish 
the death penalty for all crimes in time of war or of imminent threat of war made it 
problematic.76 Accordingly, ‘convinced that everyone’s right to life is a basic value in a 
democratic society’ and ‘wishing to strengthen the protection of the right to life’, the 
Member States of the Council of Europe ‘resolved to take the final step in order to abolish 
the death penalty in all circumstances’.77  Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR, concerning the 
abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, was adopted by the Council of Europe 
in 2002.78 Protocol No. 13 provides for the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances, including in time of war or of imminent threat of war.79 Any State Party 
to the ECHR can become a party to it.80 
1.6   Progress on the death penalty in the African regional human rights system 
 
Despite the silence of the African Charter on the death penalty, notable progress on the 
restriction of the punishment and towards its abolition has been made under the African 
regional human rights system. It is essential to highlight that progress in order to put the 
study of the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa into context. Since the African Charter 
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came into force in 1986, two African human rights treaties have been adopted which limit 
the use of the death penalty. However, those instruments do not provide for abolition of 
the death penalty as such. The first, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, prohibits the imposition of death sentences on children, expectant mothers, and 
mothers of infants and young children.81 The second, Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, prohibits the execution 
of pregnant or nursing women.82  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), the 
treaty body of the African Charter which was established in 1989,83 has been instrumental 
in the progress made on the death penalty under the African regional human rights system.  
The African Commission has the mandate to promote and protect human and peoples’ 
rights and to interpret the provisions of the Charter.84 This role is particularly crucial on 
the subject of the death penalty in light of the African Charter’s silence on it. However, 
the African Commission was rather slow in engaging on the death penalty. The 
Commission’s exercise of its mandate in respect of the death penalty began twenty years 
after its creation, when it adopted its first resolution on the death penalty in Kigali, 
Rwanda on 15 November 1999.85 The resolution urged States Parties to the African 
Charter that still maintained the death penalty to: ‘fully comply with their obligations 
under the treaty’; ‘ensure that persons accused of crimes for which the death penalty is a 
competent sentence are afforded all the guarantees in the African Charter’; ‘limit the 
imposition of the death penalty only to the most serious crimes’; ‘consider establishing a 
moratorium on executions of the death penalty’; and ‘reflect on the possibility of 
abolishing the death penalty’.86 This represented a significant first step by the African 
Commission in providing authoritative guidance on the death penalty to State Parties to 
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the African Charter. A second resolution on the death penalty was adopted by the African 
Commission in 2008 in Abuja, Nigeria, calling on State Parties to the African Charter to 
observe a moratorium on the death penalty and to ratify ICCPR-OP2.87  
 
In 2005, the African Commission established a Working Group on Death Penalty and 
Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary killings in Africa. The Working Group was 
mandated, among other things, to monitor the use of the death penalty in Africa, to 
develop plans for abolition and to carry out a study on the death penalty in the region.88  
On 19 April 2012, the Working Group published its Study on the Question of the Death 
Penalty in Africa.89 The study analyzed views in favour of and against the use of the 
punishment. It concluded that the abolitionist case was more compelling than the case for 
retaining the death penalty, and called on State Parties to the African Charter to: ratify 
the ICCPR-OP2, establish a moratorium on executions and commute all death sentences 
to terms of imprisonment.90 The study appears to have had an impact on the African 
Commission which, in the last four years, has moved from a position of urging the 
restriction of the use of the death penalty to one of urging abolition. The African 
Commission has entrenched its position on abolition of the death penalty on three fronts. 
First, following the conclusion of the Continental Conference on the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty in Africa in Benin in 2014, the African Commission issued the Cotonou 
Declaration calling on all African Union Member States which retain the death penalty 
to abolish it and on those which have already abolished it not to reintroduce it.91 
Secondly, the African Commission initiated and drafted a Protocol to the African Charter 
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on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa (Draft Abolition Protocol).92 The first 
article of the Draft Abolition Protocol, provides that: ‘States Parties shall commit 
themselves to the abolition of the death penalty by taking appropriate legislative, 
institutional and other measures.’93 In addition, Draft Article 3 requires that: ‘States 
Parties shall observe a moratorium on the imposition of death sentence and its execution 
prior to completion of the national legislative process for its legal abolition.’94 In 2015, 
the African Commission presented the Draft Abolition Protocol to the African Union95 
for adoption, but it is yet to be adopted because the AU Specialized Technical Committee 
on Legal Affairs (AU-STC) has declined to consider it, citing the lack of a legal basis for 
doing so.96 This justification is weak because the AU-STC does appear to have a legal 
mandate to consider the draft Protocol. Article 15 of African Union Constitutive Act 
provides the AU-STC with the legal power to supervise and evaluate the implementation 
of decisions taken by AU organs, which include the African Commission. Therefore, the 
AU-STC should at least have considered the Draft Abolition Protocol under Article 15. 
Unfortunately, the action of the AU-STC has effectively stalled progress on the adoption 
of the draft Protocol in the AU and it remains to be seen how the impasse will be resolved.  
Thirdly, in 2015, the African Commission adopted General Comment No. 3 on the 
African Charter on the right to life (Article 4).97 The General Comment emphasized that: 
‘international law requires those States that have not yet abolished the death penalty to 
take steps towards its abolition in order to secure the rights to life and to dignity, in 
addition to other rights such as the right to be free from torture, and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment’.98 In addition, in an unprecedented move, the African Commission 
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declared that the African Charter does not include any provision recognising the death 
penalty, even in limited circumstances, and emphasized its resolutions calling on 
abolition of the death penalty in Africa.99 
Nevertheless, the non-binding nature of African Commission resolutions and the limited 
African regional human rights instruments regulating the death penalty makes the African 
human rights system weak in regulating the imposition of death sentences. This makes 
recourse to international human rights law vital. Consequently, the influence international 
human rights law has had on the imposition of death sentences in sub-Saharan Africa will 




















The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Imposition of Death 
Sentences in sub-Saharan Africa 
In the last chapter, the notable progress on the death penalty in the African regional human 
rights system was discussed. Considering the silence of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Right (African Charter) on the death penalty, this progress indicates positive 
momentum towards abolition of the death penalty in Africa. However, the remarkably 
high number of death sentences imposed in sub-Saharan Africa remains a concern. 
Between 2008 and 2017, a staggering 5,331 death sentences were recorded in sub-
Saharan Africa.100 In 2017 alone, 15 sub-Saharan African countries imposed 878 death 
sentences.101 The number of death sentences in the region has more than doubled 
compared to ten years before when 362 death sentences were recorded.102 
This chapter seeks to establish the influence international human rights law has had on 
the imposition of death sentences in sub-Saharan African countries. This is important 
because the imposition of death sentences constitutes the start of the process of the use of 
the death penalty; accordingly, it is the first crucial step in investigating the extent to 
which international human rights law has influenced the law and practice of sub-Saharan 
African countries on the death penalty.  
The chapter begins with the examination of the mandatory imposition of death sentences 
and how two countries – Malawi and Kenya – in sub-Saharan Africa have prohibited it. 
Then it discusses the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
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and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (ICCPR-OP2) and the 
restriction of the imposition of death sentences in Benin. This is followed by an analysis 
of the role of international criminal tribunals in limiting the use of death sentences in 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone.  
2.1   Prohibition of mandatory death sentences 
 
International human rights law prohibits the mandatory imposition of death sentences 
even for the most serious crimes.103 Mandatory death sentences take away the power of 
the courts to consider significant evidence and potentially mitigating circumstances when 
an individual is sentenced after conviction.104 It also makes it impossible for the sentence 
to reflect the different levels of moral reprehensibility of a capital offence.105 UN experts 
and human rights treaty monitoring bodies and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights106 have observed that mandatory death sentences make it certain that the 
punishment will be imposed on some people despite it not being commensurate 
considering the circumstances of the crime, as a result individual sentencing is necessary 
to avoid the arbitrary deprivation of life.107 Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example Ghana and Nigeria, regularly impose mandatory death sentences.108 However, 
developments in Malawi and Kenya indicate that this trend is changing.  
In Malawi, treason, rape, murder, armed robbery and burglary are all punishable by death 
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following conviction by the court.109 However, until 2007 only murder was punishable 
with a mandatory sentence of death.110 This changed when the High Court of Malawi, 
sitting in its Constitutional Court capacity, prohibited the mandatory imposition of death 
sentences for murder in Kafantayeni and Others v. Attorney General.111 This judgment 
was a landmark one because it ended a long statute-based tradition of imposing death 
sentences in Malawi.112 Francis Kafantayeni, the plaintiff, was tried for murder of his 
two-year-old stepson. He admitted the crime but raised the defence of temporary insanity 
induced by smoking Indian hemp. He was convicted and sentenced to death pursuant to 
Sections 209 and 210 of the Penal Code. The plaintiff subsequently petitioned the 
Constitutional Court seeking a declaration that the mandatory death sentence imposed on 
him was unconstitutional.113 He was later joined in the suit by five other prisoners who 
had also been convicted of murder and had the mandatory death sentence imposed on 
them. 
The Court held that the mandatory imposition of death sentences violated three individual 
human rights.114 First, the right to be free from cruel, inhuman punishment,115 because of 
the lack of discretionary sentencing which could lead to people being sentenced to death 
for a crime that did not deserve the death penalty. Secondly, the right to a fair trial,116 
because a defendant in a capital case is not able to present mitigating evidence during 
judicial proceedings which could prevent the imposition of a death sentence. Thirdly, the 
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right of access to the court,117 because the system did not enable appeal against guilt and 
sentencing separately. The three rights in question are provided for in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Malawi is a party.118 However, 
it is the second violation that is particularly relevant to this chapter, as the court was 
clearly influenced by international human rights law in establishing it.  
The plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the mandatory imposition of death sentences as 
provided by section 210 of the Penal Code contravenes Section 42(2)(f) of the 
Constitution which guarantees the right of every accused person to a fair trial.119 He 
contended that section 210 of the Penal Code effectively prevented the courts from 
determining the sentence for anyone convicted of murder and for having regard to the 
individual circumstances of either the offence or the offender.120 In support of his 
arguments, counsel cited Article 14(5) ICCPR which provides: ‘Everyone convicted of a 
crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher 
tribunal according to law.’121 He also cited the case of Edwards v The Bahamas where 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that because the mandatory death 
sentence is compulsory and automatic it could not be effectively reviewed on appeal.122  
The Constitutional Court noted that when an accused person is on trial, the principle of 
fair trial must be respected at all stages of the trial, including sentencing.123  The Court 
ruled that the ICCPR forms part of the body of current norms of public international law 
to which it must have regard in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution and as such 
it was obliged to apply Article 14(5) ICCPR.124 The Court held: 
We agree with counsel that the effect of the mandatory death sentence under section 
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210 of the Malawi Penal for the crime of murder is to deny the accused as a 
convicted person the right to have his or her sentence reviewed by a higher court 
than the court that imposed the sentence; and we hold that this is a violation of the 
right to a fair trial which in our judgment extends to sentencing.125 
The Constitutional Court declared Section 210 of the Penal Code invalid insofar as it 
made the death penalty mandatory for murder, quashed the death sentence imposed on 
each of the plaintiffs, and ordered that individual resentencing be held for the plaintiffs.126  
The decision in Kafantayeni demonstrates the importance of international human rights 
law for the interpretation of the Malawian Constitution.127 Also, it is significant for 
prohibiting mandatory death sentences in Malawi. As emphasized by the Court, the effect 
of the judgment was not to outlaw the death penalty for murder but to give judicial 
discretion to judges when sentencing for the offence.128 Although a person may still be 
sentenced to death for murder if the court deems it appropriate, the removal of the 
mandatory sentence effectively restricts the imposition of death sentences in Malawi. As 
a result of the decision, the 192 prisoners on death row at the time became entitled to re-
sentencing.129 However, one major drawback since the Kafantayeni decision is the slow 
progress in resentencing the prisoners on death row, a problem which one scholar has 
attributed to the acute shortage of lawyers and the overwhelmed legal aid scheme in 
Malawi.130 As at April 2015, following resentencing hearings, only 29 prisoners had been 
given new sentences ranging from immediate release to 24 years imprisonment.131 The 
delays experienced by these death row prisoners undermines the success achieved in 
Kafantayeni and arguably constitutes a violation of the right to fair trial which the 
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Constitutional Court emphasized in the case. 
Similarly, in December 2017, the Supreme Court of Kenya considered the validity of the 
mandatory death sentences for murder in Muruatetu & another v Republic. 132 The major 
issue for the Court to determine was whether the mandatory imposition of the death 
sentence for murder provided under Section 204 of the Penal Code was a violation of the 
right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 50(2) of the Kenya Constitution.133 The High 
Court had convicted the petitioners of murder and sentenced them to death as provided 
by Section 204 of the Penal Code. The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeal against 
both conviction and sentence was dismissed. They subsequently filed two separate 
appeals at the Supreme Court which were consolidated.  
The Supreme Court used Article 14 ICCPR, which also provides for the right to a fair 
trial, to interpret Article 50(2) of the Constitution and established that, in order for Section 
204 to stand, it must accord with the following principles: the rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Constitution belong to each individual; the bill of rights in the constitution 
applies to all law and binds all persons; all persons have inherent dignity which must be 
respected and protected; the State must ensure access to justice to all; every person is 
entitled to a fair hearing; and the right to a fair trial is non-derogable.134 Article 50(2) of 
the Constitution and Article 14 ICCPR both provide for the right to a fair trial similarly, 
it is therefore remarkable that the court used the latter to interpret the former. A probable 
explanation for this is that the Court used the instrument to justify the Constitutional 
provisions as it sought to invalidate Section 204. Support for this is evident in the Court’s 
emphasis on the fact that Kenya has been a party to ICCPR since May 1972,135 and its 
declaration that ‘a generous and purposive interpretation is to be given to the 
constitutional provisions that protect human rights’136 and the ‘court must give life and 
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meaning to the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution.’137  
In addition, the Court declared that the right to a fair trial ‘is one of the inalienable rights 
enshrined in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)’138 and 
used that to rationalize why Article 25(c) of the Constitution makes the right one ‘which 
cannot be limited or taken away from a litigant.’139 Thus, it decided that because Section 
204 deprives the Court of judicial discretion in sentencing, it failed to meet the fair trial 
principles that accrue to accused persons under Article 25 of the Constitution.140 Indeed 
the preamble of UDHR confirms that all the rights contained in it are inalienable. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s recourse to UDHR to justify the inalienable nature of the right 
to a fair trial, even when Article 25 of the Constitution makes it clear that the right cannot 
be limited, is further evidence of the influence of international human rights law on the 
Court’s interpretation of the human rights provisions of the Constitution. Although 
UDHR is not a treaty, the Supreme Court was empowered to apply it because the 
Constitution makes general rules of international law directly applicable to Kenya.141 
Furthermore, the Court relied on Article 26 ICCPR which provides for the right of 
freedom from discrimination and Article 27 of the Constitution, which equally provides 
for that right, to declare Section 204 discriminatory, because it ‘gives differential 
treatment to a convict under that Section, distinct from the kind of treatment accorded to 
a convict under a Section that does not impose a mandatory sentence.’142 In that regard, 
the Court concluded that not allowing convicts facing death sentence the opportunity to 
be heard in mitigation when those facing lesser sentences are allowed to be heard in 
mitigation was indefensibly discrimination and unfair.143 Accordingly, it held that Section 
204 violated Article 27 of the Constitution. Again the Court used a provision of ICCPR 
as an interpretative tool for the Constitution, but it could have done more by also declaring 
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that Section 204 violated Article 26 ICCPR since ICCPR forms part of the laws of 
Kenya.144 
Lastly, in its consideration of Constitutional provisions in relation to Section 204, the 
Court referred to the 2005 UN Commission on Human Right’s resolution on the death 
penalty.145 The resolution calls on states that still maintain the death penalty not to use 
the punishment as a mandatory sentence even for the most serious crimes.146 The Court 
referred to the resolution to comprehend the position of international human rights law 
on mandatory death sentences and was persuaded by it in declaring Section 204 invalid.147 
However, the Court did not explain why it was persuaded by it. Such an explanation is 
particularly important because resolutions of the UN Commission, which was replaced in 
2006 by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), are persuasive and not legally binding on 
states.148 Moreover, the UN Commission’s resolution did not clarify why state’s should 
not impose mandatory death sentences. Therefore, courts in jurisdictions that still use 
mandatory death sentences may not be so persuaded by the resolution. The authority of 
the judgment on that point would have been strengthened if the Supreme Court had 
provided a rationale for relying on the resolution. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court declared the mandatory imposition of death sentences 
as provide under Section 204 of the Penal Code unconstitutional and invalid; however it 
emphasized that this did not invalidate the use of death sentences as a punishment.149 In 
addition, it ordered the remittance of the matter to the High Court for re-hearing on 
sentencing only; that the appropriate authorities set up within 12 months of the judgement 
a sentence re-hearing framework for all cases similar to that of the petitioners; and 
necessary changes are made to legislation to give effect to the judgment.  
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Just like in Kafantayeni the Supreme Court’s decision was clearly influenced by 
international human rights law. Although the outcomes of Kafantayeni and Muruatetu are 
similar, the Court in the latter engaged in more analysis of the Constitution in relation to 
international human rights law than the former.  Muruatetu has altered the way death 
sentences are imposed for murder in Kenya. Judges now have discretion whether to 
impose death sentences for murder. This will likely result in judges imposing fewer death 
sentences for murder since they don’t have to automatically sentence people to death but 
must consider mitigating circumstances. The Office of the Attorney-General and 
Department of Justice has set up a committee to implement the Supreme Court 
judgment;150resentencing hearings are expected to commence after the committee 
finalises the framework for resentencing. Just like the resentencing hearings that followed 
Kafantayeni resulted in the substitution of death sentences with less severe punishments, 
it is envisaged that resentencing hearings in Kenya will have the same effect. 
2.2   The influence of an abolitionist international human rights instrument 
 
For close to six decades, the law in Benin prescribed death sentences for several offences 
including aggravated murder, sorcery and magic that led to death, kidnapping that 
resulted in death, acts of terrorism, espionage and treason.151 However, in the last six 
years, two landmark judgments by the Constitutional Court of Benin have brought an end 
to the imposition of death sentences in that country despite the punishment remaining on 
the statute books. Following the adoption of a new Code of Criminal Procedure by the 
National Assembly on 30 March 2012,152 the Constitutional Court was asked by the 
government to determine the constitutionality of the new law.153 The Constitutional 
Court, among other issues, held that Articles 685(2) and 793 of the new Code, which 
allowed for the imposition of death sentences for criminal offences, should be deleted by 
the National Assembly because it conflicted with Article 147 of the Constitution which 
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gave international treaties precedence over domestic laws.154 The Court explained that 
Benin had acceded to ICCPR-OP2,155 and that the accession had been authorized by the 
National Assembly through Law No. 2011-11 of 25 August 2011.156 It emphasized that 
ICCPR-OP2 was aimed at abolishing the death penalty and that since Benin had become 
a party to the legal instrument it was obliged to abide by it and as such ‘no legal provision 
can now mention the death penalty’ in Benin.157  The National Assembly subsequently 
complied with the judgment by removing the two provisions from the Criminal Procedure 
Code.158 
However, although the judgment was significant in its interpretation and use of ICCPR-
OP2 to render invalid the new law’s provision for the death penalty, it has two 
shortcomings. In the first place, the judgment was limited only to the new Code of 
Criminal Procedure which was swiftly amended by the legislature to implement the 
judgment. The effect of this was that other laws in Benin which prescribed the death 
sentence for certain offences remained valid after the judgment. Secondly, the 
Constitutional Court’s declaration on ICCPR-OP2 was brief and failed to explain how 
accession to ICCPR-OP2 prevents a State Party like Benin from imposing death sentences 
in a new law.159 This is important because, as explained below, ICCPR-OP2 does not 
expressly prohibit State Parties from imposing death sentences. 
In 2016, in a second significant decision, Benin’s Constitutional Court again ruled on the 
imposition of death sentences.160 The Court was asked to determine whether Article 302 
of the Criminal Code, which prescribes the death sentence for the crime of assassination, 
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parricide or poisoning, or murder for the purpose of cannibalism, was contrary to the 
Benin Constitution and the African Charter which both guarantee the right to life.161 The 
Constitutional Court affirmed its 2012 decision and went further, declaring:  
Whereas it follows that no legal provision contained in the internal legal order can 
any longer mention the death penalty; that, likewise, no criminal prosecution 
undertaken by any jurisdiction can have as its legal basis a provision stipulating the 
death penalty as the punishment for the offence committed, such that no one can 
now be sentenced to death in Benin.162  
The second judgment went further than the first by unequivocally prohibiting the 
imposition of death sentences in Benin in all existing laws, thereby addressing a part of 
the shortcomings mentioned above. Like the first judgment, however, it still failed to 
justify its conclusion that accession to ICCPR-OP2 prevents a State Party from imposing 
death sentences. In addition, the Constitutional Court did not address the question 
whether Article 302 of the Criminal Code was contrary to the African Charter. A 
consideration of the question is particularly important in the context of Benin’s 
ratification of the African Charter and in light of the Constitution conferring greater 
authority (i.e. supremacy) on international instruments Benin has ratified.163 It is unclear 
from the judgment why the court did not address that question; it was a missed 
opportunity for the Constitutional Court to pronounce on the incompatibility of the 
imposition of a death sentence with Article 4 of the African Charter. Instead, the Court 
chose to strike down the imposition of death sentences simply on the grounds of Benin 
being a State Party to ICCPR-OP2. 
The two Constitutional Court judgments are certainly progressive and set new standards 
for the interpretation and application of ICCPR-OP2. They signaled the first time that a 
national court of a State Party had used ICCPR-OP2 as grounds for prohibiting the 
imposition of death sentences in its jurisdiction. However, the fact that the Constitutional 
Court did not explain how it had arrived at its decisions is not helpful and opens them to 
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criticism. Since ICCPR-OP2 does not expressly prohibit States Parties from imposing 
death sentences, it is arguable that they are not precluded from imposing such sentences. 
ICCPR-OP2 imposes two obligations on State Parties. First, it provides that ‘no one 
within the jurisdiction of a State Party shall be executed’; and secondly, it provides that 
each State Party ‘shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its 
jurisdiction.’164 The wording of these two obligations appears to acknowledge that while 
the imposition of death sentences is still possible, no executions must be carried out in 
the jurisdiction of the State Party. Therefore, on the express reading of Article 1 of 
ICCPR-OP2, it could be argued that Benin’s Constitutional Court went too far in its 
interpretation. However, this position can be countered with two arguments which 
vindicates the Constitutional Court. 
First, the introduction of new laws which impose death sentences by a State Party to 
ICCPR-OP2 constitutes a violation of the treaty.165 Liberia’s introduction of a new law 
prescribing death sentences for a range of offences, despite being a State Party to ICCPR-
OP2, and the reaction of the international human rights community to it illustrates this 
point. On 22 July 2008, the then Liberian President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, signed into 
law a Bill which amended the 1976 Penal Code by providing that death sentences shall 
be imposed on an offender who, during the commission of the crimes of terrorism or 
hijacking or armed robbery, causes the death of his victim.166 Amnesty International 
criticized the law and 'called on President Johnson-Sirleaf to repeal the law' because it 
'directly' violated Liberia’s obligations under ICCPR-OP2.167 William Schabas argued 
that what the Liberian President had done was a violation of Liberia's obligations under 
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR and ICCPR-OP2.168 The UN Human Rights Committee, the 
treaty enforcement body of ICCPR-OP2, also condemned the action of Liberia and 
                                                     
164
 ICCPR-OP2, art 1. 
165
 Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi, ‘High Crime Rate Forces Liberia to Reintroduce the Death Penalty and put 
International Treaty Obligations Aside: What the Critics Missed’ (2009) 17 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 342.  
166
 Ibid, 342. 
167
 Amnesty International, 'Liberia: Amnesty International Calls for Repeal of Death Penalty Law Signed 
by Liberian President' (AFR 34/009/2008, 25 July 2008).  
168
 William Schabas, 'Liberian Parliament Attempts to Reinstate Capital Punishment' (8 August 2008) 




emphasized that the new law constitutes a clear breach by Liberia of its international legal 
obligations under ICCPR-OP2.169  
Secondly, the Constitutional Court, as an organ of the state,170 was fulfilling the second 
obligation required by ICCPR-OP2. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969171 supports and strengthens this point. Article 31(1) of the Convention provides that 
‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Constitutional Court interpreted Article 1(b) of 
ICCPR-OP2 in good faith, by prohibiting the imposition of death sentences, in order to 
fulfil the Protocol’s aim of abolishing the death penalty in Benin. The preamble of 
ICCPR-OP2 notes ‘that Article 6 of the ICCPR refers to abolition of the death penalty in 
terms that strongly suggest that abolition is desirable’.172 In addition, not only does the 
title of the Protocol indicate that abolition of the death penalty was its ‘object and 
purpose’, the preamble strongly affirms this fact. The preamble makes it clear that States 
Parties to the Protocol were ‘convinced that all measures of abolition of the death penalty 
should be considered as progress in the enjoyment of the right to life’ and were ‘desirous 
to undertake hereby an international commitment to abolish the death penalty’.173  
The two Constitutional Court judgments illustrate the influence of international human 
rights law on Benin in restricting the imposition of death sentences despite the 
punishment remaining in the country’s laws. ICCPR-OP2 was vital in that regard. 
Without it and Benin’s accession to the instrument, the Constitutional Court could not 
have restricted the imposition of death sentences in the way it did. In fact, as result of the 
                                                     
169
 'Rights Panel Concerned by Clear Breach of Law in New Liberia Death Penalty Legislation' (26 August 
2008) <http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/NewsRoom? OpenFrameSet> accessed 20 June 2018. 
170
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), 26. Art 4(1) provides: ‘The 
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the 
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the 
organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial 
unit of the State. 
171
 115 UNTS 332. The Convention was adopted on 22 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 
1980. 
172
 1642 UNTS 414, preamble, para. 4.  
173
 Ibid, preamble, paras 5 and 6. 
41 
 
judgments, ICCPR-OP2’s influence on the death penalty in Benin has gone beyond the 
Constitutional Court. As discussed above, the National Assembly was compelled by the 
2012 judgment to delete two provisions, entrenching imposition of death sentences, from 
the Criminal Procedure Code Bill; this would not have happened without the influence of 
ICCPR-OP2. Moreover, the government has recently informed the HRC of the 2016 
judgment and used it as evidence of Benin’s fulfilment of the commitment arising from 
its accession to ICCPR-OP2.174 In addition, the government stated that, because of its 
obligations under ICCPR-OP2, it had started the process of reviewing the Criminal Code 
in order to abolish the death penalty completely in law.175  
2.3   The role of international tribunals 
 
The facts of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 have been well documented and will not be 
repeated here.176 Of importance though is the role that the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) played in influencing the imposition of death sentences in the 
country. The ICTR was established by UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 
November 1994 which was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.177 Its purpose 
was to prosecute persons accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed 
in neighbouring states between 1 January and 31 December 1994.178 It has been argued 
that the ICTR was born out of the efforts of the international community to respond to 
the Rwandan genocide.179 Although this may be true, the role played by Rwandan 
authorities in pressing the international community to establish the ICTR must not be 
underestimated. Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), specifically referred to the 
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request of the Government of Rwanda, making it clear that the co-operation and consent 
of Rwanda was received.180 
It is interesting to note that despite having requested the setting up of the ICTR, Rwanda 
voted against Resolution 955. After the vote, the Rwandan government explained why it 
had voted against the resolution. First, Rwanda objected to the short jurisdiction of the 
ICTR, which was restricted from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994, arguing that this 
time period would not cover the planning stages of the genocide.181 Secondly, it felt the 
staffing plans were inadequate.182 Thirdly, Rwanda objected to the UN’s plan to locate 
the ICTR outside Rwanda.183 Finally, the death sentence was excluded from the 
punishment that the ICTR could impose.184 The last reason created a situation in which 
convicted persons would not have the death sentence imposed on them like their 
counterparts convicted of similar offences by the national courts in Rwanda. This 
situation was aptly explained by the Rwandan representative on the Security Council: 
Since it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing with suspects who devised, 
planned and organized the genocide, these may escape capital punishment whereas 
those who simply carried out their plans would be subjected to the harshness of this 
sentence. That situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.185 
Some scholars have commented on the exclusion of the death sentence from the 
punishments that the ICTR could impose. Jose Alvarez has argued that the exclusion 
created an anomaly in which the international community conferred mercy on high-level 
perpetrators of the genocide which it did not accord to the victims of the genocide and 
that the ICTR could not deliver the ‘highest form of justice’ if it did not allow the 
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execution of perpetrators of genocide.186 
Gerard Prunier strongly advocated for the imposition of death sentences on the highest 
level organizers of the genocide as ‘the only ritual through which the killers can be 
cleansed of their guilt and the survivors brought back to the community of the living.’187 
He argued that the international community was hypocritical in permitting the death 
penalty at the Nuremberg Tribunal but not for the ICTR.188  
However, Schraga and Zacklin were sympathetic of the position of the Security Council: 
Members of the Security Council, and in particular signatories of the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 
who have undertaken to abolish the death penalty within their national jurisdiction, 
quite obviously could not have supported its introduction in an international 
jurisdiction.189 
Schraga and Zacklin’s explanation provides a useful insight into why the Security 
Council could not have supported the introduction of the death penalty for an international 
tribunal. Indeed, there is evidence which supports this view. At the Security Council 
meeting on the establishment of the ICTR, the representative of New Zealand expressed 
disappointment at Rwanda’s position, and explained why the Tribunal could not be 
allowed to use the death penalty as punishment: 
We recall that the Government of Rwanda requested the Tribunal. That is a fact. 
We are disappointed that it has not supported this resolution. We understand that 
this is principally because of its desire that those convicted of genocide should be 
executed. As a State party to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, New Zealand could never support an international 
tribunal that could impose the death penalty. For over three decades the United 
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Nations has been trying progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be 
entirely unacceptable – and a dreadful step backwards – to introduce it here. Indeed, 
it would also go against the spirit of the Arusha Agreement, which the Government 
of Rwanda has said it will honour and which commit all parties in Rwanda to accept 
international human rights standards.190 
Although international human rights law permits the imposition of death sentences for 
the most serious crimes, support for the use of death penalty for international crimes has 
now dwindled. At the time the ICTR was established, international human rights laws 
restricting the imposition of death sentences had developed and the legal context relating 
to sentences for international crimes had changed significantly from the Second World 
War era when the death penalty was applied to serious international crimes.191 This is 
reflected in the fact that International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), which was established by the UN Security Council in 1993, a year before the 
ICTR, cannot impose death sentences.192 Since then, a number of other 
international/internationalised criminal tribunals have also been set up to prosecute the 
perpetrators of international crimes,193 none of which allow for the imposition of death 
sentences.194 Despite the opposition of Rwanda, the Security Council persisted and the 
highest penalty that the ICTR can impose remains imprisonment.195 This was to have a 
profound effect on the way in which Rwanda would later use the death penalty.  
In 1996 the Rwandan authorities decided to supplement the work of the ICTR by 
prosecuting those implicated in the 1994 genocide in the domestic courts of Rwanda.196 
The Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the 
Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990 (1996 
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Organic Law) was enacted.197 The Law classified accused persons into four categories 
according to the gravity of the offence and level of the crime.198 
An interesting element of the 1996 Organic Law was that only individuals in Category 
One were subject to the death sentence.199 Category Two offenders – perpetrators, 
conspirators, or accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault causing death 
– were liable to a maximum of life imprisonment. Yet, under the Rwanda Penal Code, 
persons convicted of murder, which did not fall within the context of the 1994 genocide, 
still faced the death penalty.200 The restriction of death sentences in the 1996 Organic 
Law to the ringleaders of the genocide marked a shift in attitude by the Rwanda 
authorities. It is unclear to what extent the ICTR’s stance on the death penalty influenced 
the Rwandan authorities to restrict death sentences in the 1996 Organic Law. However, 
as Van Zyl Smit contends, it is at least plausible to argue that it had a restraining 
influence.201 This influence is evident in the fact that the 1996 Organic Law, which was 
specifically enacted to supplement the work of the ICTR on genocidal crimes, restricted 
death sentences but the Penal Code was not amended to incorporate the same restriction. 
Stronger evidence of the influence of the ICTR emerged years later when UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1503 of August 2003202 and 1534 of March 2004203 requested that 
the ICTR finish its work in 2010 and transfer cases back to Rwanda. In other to comply 
with these resolutions, on 10 June 2004 the ICTR amended Rule 11 bis of its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence to allow the referral of cases to national jurisdictions, stating that 
‘the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the death 
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penalty will not be imposed or carried out.’204 The Rwandan government, which had long 
been interested in receiving cases from the ICTR due to its policy of maximum 
accountability for genocide-related crimes, had to legally guarantee that it would not 
impose the death sentence on any accused persons transferred to it.205 In order to fulfil 
the ICTR referral requirements, on 16 March 2007 the Rwandan government adopted the 
Organic Law Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the ICTR 
and from Other States.206 Article 21 stipulates: ‘Life imprisonment shall be the heaviest 
penalty imposed on a convicted person in a case transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR.’207 
This law effectively prevented Rwandan courts from imposing death sentences in cases 
transferred from the ICTR.  
The paradox created by excluding the death sentence at the ICTR while Rwandan law 
allowed it is not unique to Rwanda.208 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court) 
created a similar paradox. The Special Court was established in January 2002, in the 
aftermath of the Sierra Leone civil war, by an agreement between the UN and the 
Government of Sierra Leone.209 The agreement was pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000.210 Unlike ICTR, the Special Court is a hybrid 
institution, in the sense that it was created to try both offences under international criminal 
law and domestic offences.211 Also, unlike the ICTR which was established by a Security 
Council resolution, the Special Court was established by a treaty.212 Nonetheless, the 
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Special Court, like the ICTR, is an international criminal court, not a national court.213 
The Special Court cannot impose death sentences, but limited to imposing imprisonment 
and ordering property forfeiture,214 yet under Sierra Leonean law the death sentence is 
applicable to murder, treason, armed robbery, and robbery with aggravation.215 The same 
international human rights law considerations, discussed above, which precluded the 
ICTR from imposing death sentences apply to the Special Court, to the extent that the 
penalties permitted by the Statute establishing the Special Court mirror that of the 
ICTR.216  
Van Zyl Smit has argued that since the Special Court, which has equivalent status to the 
highest domestic court of Sierra Leone, is unable to impose death sentences, the 
punishment will stop being imposed by the domestic courts for ordinary murder.217 Van 
Zyl Smit argued on the ground that the Special Court is more fully integrated into the 
legal system of Sierra Leone than the equivalent ICTR was in Rwanda.218 Indeed, this 
ground is valid as the Special Court has the power to prosecute persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility, not only for serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
but for crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law and territory since 30 November 
1996.219 Also, the Special Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts of 
Sierra Leone, but with primacy over them on matters contained in the Special Court’s 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.220 However, contrary to Van Zyl Smit’s 
argument, Sierra Leone’s national courts have not ceased the imposition of death 
sentences for murder or other ordinary capital crimes. For example, in November 2017, 
two men were sentenced to death for murder by the High Court of Freetown;221 and 
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throughout 2017 Sierra Leone imposed 21 death sentences and by the end of that year 39 
prisoners were on death row, an indication that 18 prisoners had been sentenced to death 
in previous years.222  
Nevertheless, since the Special Court is not able to impose death sentences, even for 
crimes that attract the death sentence under Sierra Leonean law,223 it is plausible to argue 
that the Special Court has indeed restricted the imposition of death sentences in Sierra 
Leone. 
2.4   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the influence of international human rights law on the 
imposition of death sentences in sub-Saharan African countries. The courts in Malawi 
and Kenya have used the ICCPR and UDHR as tools of interpreting their national 
Constitutions to prohibit the mandatory imposition of death sentences for murder. Judges 
in the two countries now have discretionary powers to decide not to impose death 
sentences for murder after considering the mitigating circumstances of convicts. 
Consequently, in Malawi, resentencing hearings have resulted in the replacement of some 
death sentences with less severe punishments. Also, because of Benin’s accession to 
ICCPR-OP2, the Constitutional Court has prohibited the imposition of death sentences 
by the courts and introduction of death sentences in new laws by the legislature. 
Furthermore, due to international human rights law, international tribunals established by 
the UN for Rwanda and Sierra Leone cannot impose death sentences on convicts despite 
the availability of the punishment under domestic laws. Thus, Rwanda amended its law 
to exclude the imposition of death sentences in cases transferred from the ICTR to 
Rwandan courts, and in practice death sentences cannot be imposed by the Special Court 
even in cases that require them under Sierra Leonean law. International human rights law 
has effectively restricted the imposition of death sentences in the countries considered. 
However, restrictions do not necessarily eliminate the use of death sentences. If death 
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sentences remain lawful the courts may impose them. When death sentences are imposed, 
clemency becomes an essential factor in preventing executions. Therefore, the right to 
seek clemency under international human rights law and the extent to which that body of 
law has influenced the granting of clemency in death penalty cases in sub-Saharan Africa 





















Death Penalty Clemency 
As demonstrated in the last chapter, international human rights law has influenced some 
sub-Saharan African countries to restrict the imposition of death sentences. However, 
when a death sentence is imposed and a right of appeal has been exhausted or an appeal 
against conviction and the death sentence has not been pursued, the only remedy available 
is seeking clemency.  
Clemency is an important theme which exists between the imposition of death sentences 
and their implementation, that is, the carrying out of executions. Without exploration of 
clemency, there would be a void in the study of the death penalty because the imposition 
of death sentences does not always result in executions. Therefore, this chapter aims to 
determine whether, and if so to what extent, international human rights law has influenced 
the use of the death penalty through the granting of clemency in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The chapter is divided into two main parts. First, the status of death penalty clemency in 
international human rights law is examined. Secondly, there is an analysis of the influence 
of international human rights law on the grant of death penalty clemency in five 
significant countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
3.1   Death penalty clemency in international human rights law 
 
Clemency can be described as an act of mercy by the authorities of a state, usually but 
not exclusively by the Executive, which reduces or completely removes a judicial 
punishment.224 Clemency is a term generally used to describe commutation or pardon, or 
both.225 It has been described as ‘the last hope for a prisoner under sentence of death’,226 
and ‘the last chance to correct errors’.227 Clemency effectively prevents the 
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implementation of a death sentence by the state authorities.228 As Sarat puts it: ‘Executive 
clemency in capital cases is distinctive in that it is the only power that can prevent death 
once it has been prescribed and, through appellate review, approved as a legally 
appropriate punishment.’229 In most countries clemency is usually granted by the 
Executive, but in some countries the Legislature and the Judiciary have the power to grant 
it. The reasons for granting clemency vary and can include doubts about the applicant’s 
guilt and trial; the convict’s remorse and rehabilitation; government policy changes; 
public interest in the case; prison decongestion; or even to celebrate a national holiday.230 
However, research has identified two main purposes of clemency. The first is that 
'clemency is the final fail safe to remedy mistakes made by the courts, and, among other 
possibilities, can be used to commute the sentences of innocent inmates.’231 Secondly, 
‘clemency is granted as a showing of mercy due to unique facts or circumstances arising 
outside of the judicial system.’232 
The right to seek death penalty clemency is guaranteed under international human rights 
law. Article 6(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides: ‘Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation 
of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted 
in all cases.’233 Pardon, commutation and amnesty have different meanings in death 
penalty cases. Commutation is the replacement of a death sentence with a less severe 
punishment, such as a term of imprisonment, either by the Judiciary on appeal or by the 
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Executive.234 Pardon is the complete exemption of a person under sentence of death from 
further punishment.235 Amnesty, on the other hand, constitutes the immediate end to 
prosecution and punishment for specific crimes.236   
Safeguard 7 of the UN Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing 
the Death Penalty237 states: ‘Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek 
pardon, or commutation of sentence; pardon or commutation of sentence may be granted 
in all cases of capital punishment’. It is worth noting that unlike Article 6(4) of the 
ICCPR, Safeguard 7 does not mention ‘amnesty’. This is because ‘amnesty’ is granted 
by the state of its own initiative and not applied for by the individual. William Schabas 
has argued that this is what makes it inappropriate to call ‘amnesty’ a right.238 There is 
some credibility in Schabas’s argument. A close inspection of Article 6(4) reveals that 
the Covenant does not list ‘amnesty’ as a right, alongside ‘pardon’ and ‘commutation’, 
which a person may seek after being sentenced to death. The first sentence of the 
paragraph states: ‘Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or 
commutation of the sentence.’ Whereas the second paragraph states: ‘Amnesty, pardon 
or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases’. The second 
paragraph indicates that ‘amnesty’ is provided for only as an option, together with 
‘pardon’ and ‘commutation’, which may be granted in all death penalty cases.  
The UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR), the body of independent experts that 
monitors the implementation of the ICCPR by States Parties and provides authoritative 
interpretation of the Covenant’s provisions, has over the years interpreted Article 6(4). 
However, the interpretations have not provided clarity on the scope of the right to seek 
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death penalty clemency.239 Nonetheless, two years ago the CCPR began drafting its latest 
authoritative interpretation of Article 6, General comment No. 36, which provides 
detailed interpretation and clarity on the scope of the right.240 The CCPR in July 2017 
finalised its first reading of the draft General Comment and has invited all interested 
stakeholders to comment on the draft.241 The final document is yet to be issued and it 
remains to be seen how the General Comment will impact the jurisprudence on death 
penalty clemency. 
Nevertheless, UN bodies and one Special Procedure Mandate have emphasized the 
importance of the right to seek death penalty clemency. The UN Economic and Social 
Council has urged UN Member States that still use the death penalty to implement and 
strengthen Safeguard 7 by ‘providing for mandatory appeals or review with provisions 
for clemency or pardon in all cases of capital offence.’242 Likewise, the UN Commission 
on Human Rights has urged all states that maintain the death penalty ‘to ensure…the right 
to seek pardon or commutation of sentence.’243 Also, the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC) has established that the imposition of a death sentence by the state without the 
opportunity to seek pardon or commutation is a contravention of the ICCPR.244 In 
addition, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
has stressed that ‘there can be no exception to the defendant’s right to seek pardon, 
clemency or commutation of the sentence’245 and that ‘appeals for clemency should 
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provide effective opportunities to safeguard lives.’246 
In addition to the international human rights instruments highlighted, regional human 
rights treaties also guarantee the right to seek death penalty clemency. Article 4(6) of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention)247 states: ‘Every person 
condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of 
sentence, which may be granted in all cases’. Similarly, Article 10 of the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights248 provides that ‘anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek 
pardon or commutation of the sentence’. 
The right to seek death penalty clemency is not provided for under the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) or any other African regional human 
rights treaty. The absence of such a provision in the African Charter is understandable. 
Since the Charter itself is silent on the death penalty, it is inconceivable that it would 
provide for a right to seek death penalty clemency. 
Although the right to seek death penalty clemency is settled in international human rights 
law, it is important to emphasize that death penalty clemency on its own is not a right. 
What constitutes the right is the seeking of clemency when a death sentence has been 
imposed which suggests that a process is required.  Article 6(4) does not provide a specific 
procedure for the exercise of the right to seek pardon or commutation following the 
imposition of a death sentence. States Parties have the discretion to determine the required 
procedure.249 Nevertheless, in its recent draft General Comment, the CCPR has 
emphasized that clemency procedures must be specified in the domestic law and must not 
give the crime victim’s family ‘a preponderant role’ in the decision-making process.250  
The CCPR has further emphasized that clemency procedures must offer safeguards that 
include: ‘certainty about the processes followed and the substantive criteria applied; a 
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right for individuals sentenced to death to initiate pardon or commutation procedures and 
to make representations about their personal or other relevant circumstances; a right to be 
informed in advanced when the request will be considered; and a right to be informed 
promptly about the outcome of the procedure.’251  
3.2   The influence of international human rights law on death penalty clemency in 
sub-Saharan Africa 
  
In sub-Saharan Africa, the process of seeking death penalty clemency varies from country 
to country. In some countries in the region, people under sentence of death who seek 
clemency are required to make an application either themselves or through their 
representative to the relevant authorities of the state.252 However, there are instances 
where state authorities, of their own accord, grant clemency. For example, in Mali death 
sentences are systematically commuted to life imprisonment by the government even 
when an individual application has not been made.253 In Tanzania, the clemency process 
is transparent and prisoners and other people, such as representatives and family 
members, are allowed to contribute to the process, whereas in neighbouring Kenya the 
opinions of prisoners are not considered.254 On the other hand, in Botswana the clemency 
process is plagued by secrecy and no reasons are published for clemency decisions.255  
Most sub-Saharan African constitutions establish a procedure for seeking death penalty 
clemency. In some countries, like Ghana and Botswana, the decision is for the President 
or Head of State alone.256 Sometimes within the country, the Governor of a state, in the 
case of Nigeria, or the head of a semi-autonomous region, in the case of Zanzibar in 
Tanzania, can grant clemency within their jurisdiction.257 Some constitutions create 
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committees on clemency to review applications, make recommendations and advise the 
final decision maker in the clemency process. For instance, the Constitution of Botswana 
creates an Advisory Committee on Prerogative of Mercy whose role is to advise the 
President on the grant of clemency in death penalty cases.258 
Between 2008 and 2017,259 21 countries granted clemency to individuals under sentence 
of death in sub-Saharan Africa.260 This number represents 75 per cent of the 28 countries 
that have not abolished the death penalty in the region. An analysis of the influence of 
international human rights law on the grant of death penalty clemency in each of the 21 
countries is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the analysis that follows will focus 
on countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are significant because in the last five years they 
have consistently granted death penalty clemency, or have granted it to many or all people 
on death row. Of the 21 countries, Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia are 
particularly significant. An analysis of the influence of international human rights law on 
the grant of death penalty clemency in each of the five countries now follows.  
3.2.1   Benin 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Constitutional Court in two landmark judgments 
rendered all laws imposing death sentences in Benin void. Despite this, 14 prisoners who 
had been under death sentences for between 18 and 19 years at the time of the second 
judgment remained on death row.261 The Court’s decisions neither referred to the 
prisoners nor provided for their clemency. There are two possible reasons for this. First, 
since clemency was not an issue put before the Court in the two cases, it could not make 
a declaration on it. Secondly, since only the President has the power to grant clemency,262 
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the Court was precluded from granting such relief. Although Benin’s accession to the 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (ICCPR-OP2)263 in 2012 effectively protected 
the prisoners from execution,264 they remained on death row for years after the accession. 
Nevertheless, the government announced, in February 2018, that the President had 
commuted the death sentences of all death row prisoners to life imprisonment.265 It 
emphasized that the decision was a consequence of Benin’s position in favour of 
abolishing the death penalty, the ratification of ICCPR-OP2, fulfilment of Benin’s 
international commitment and promotion of human rights.266  
The government’s unequivocal confirmation that Benin’s accession to ICCPR-OP2 was 
crucial in its decision to commute the death sentences is incontrovertible evidence of the 
influence the protocol has had on the country’s use of the death penalty following the 
Constitutional Court judgments. Although ICCPR-OP2 does not expressly oblige a State 
Party to grant death penalty clemency, Benin’s reliance on the protocol to justify the need 
to commute the death sentences confirms its firm commitment to its international human 
rights law obligations and the influence of that body of law on its use of the death penalty. 
Indeed, the case can be made that such grant of clemency, as exemplified by Benin, is an 
obligation that arises from being a party to ICCPR-OP2 and that keeping prisoners under 
sentence of death is incompatible with ICCPR-OP2.267  
3.2.2   Ghana 
 
In Ghana, only the President has the power to grant clemency, this power being 
entrenched in the Constitution.268 The clemency power is exercisable by the President 
‘acting in consultation with the Council of State’.269 For any offence, the President ‘may’ 
grant a pardon free or with conditions; grant commutation; suspend implementation of 
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punishment; or reduce the whole or part of a punishment.270 The use of the word ‘may’ 
is vital as it reinforces the discretionary nature of the President’s power, making it clear 
that he is not under a legal obligation to grant clemency. The powers of the President also 
extend to granting clemency for convictions and punishments imposed by a court martial 
or other military tribunals.271  
Ghana’s Constitution sets out a procedure which must be followed in all cases where a 
person is sentenced to death. A written report containing all relevant information from a 
case where a person is sentenced to death must be submitted by the trial judge or other 
judges to the President.272 However, this is where the procedure ends. The Constitution 
is not clear on why the written report needs to be submitted or what an individual needs 
to do to seek clemency from the President. However, it can be inferred from Article 72 
of the Constitution that the purpose of the requirement to submit a written report is to 
enable the President to consider whether to grant clemency. This requirement acts as an 
additional level of safeguard to the court appeal process in death penalty cases. In 
addition, the Constitution does not preclude an individual from making an application to 
the President for clemency, which implies that such an application is possible. While 
some jurisdictions require that the court appeals process must have been exhausted before 
the Executive can consider a grant of death penalty clemency, this is not the case in 
Ghana.  There is no requirement in the Constitution that a right of appeal must have been 
exhausted before the report of a death sentence is sent to the President or before he can 
exercise his clemency powers on it. This is quite remarkable as it means that the right to 
seek death penalty clemency in Ghana is not curtailed by the need to exhaust court appeal 
processes.273 
Over the years, Ghanaian Presidents have exercised their constitutional clemency powers 
in death penalty cases. As part of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Ghana’s 
independence in March 2007, then President Kufuor commuted the death sentence of 36 
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death row prisoners. Later that year he further commuted seven death sentences to life 
imprisonment during the 47th anniversary of Ghana’s republican status in June 2007.274 
Between 2012 and 2016 a total of 72 death sentences were commuted in Ghana.275 In 
commemoration of Ghana’s Republic Day in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, President John 
Mahama commuted 33, 21, 14 and 4 death sentences to life imprisonment respectively, 
it is unclear why the number of commutations decreased.276 These commutations were 
all granted to commemorate one national holiday or another and appear to have become 
a tradition for the Executive. Two pertinent points arise from the commutations. First, the 
grant of the commutations made no reference to international human rights law, 
indicating that they were apparently not influenced by that body of law. Secondly, there 
is no evidence that the commutations were granted following clemency applications by 
the prisoners, an indication that the grants were mainly an exercise of prerogative of 
mercy powers by the Executive with no recognition of the death row prisoner’s right to 
seek clemency. 
Ghana is a party to the ICCPR277 and as such is under an obligation to respect and 
implement Article 6(4) which includes the right to seek clemency.278 Despite a history of 
granting death penalty clemency, Ghana’s disposition towards the right to seek death 
penalty clemency at the UN is in direct contrast to its practice. In 2012, during the HRC’s 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), Ghana did not accept the recommendations made to it 
to commute existing death sentences279 and to continue to grant death penalty 
clemency.280 No explanation was given for rejecting those recommendations, but ever 
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since then Ghana has continued to grant clemency regularly in death penalty cases.  
Two arguments can be provided to explain this situation. First, Ghana’s rejection of the 
UPR recommendations was a political stance to indicate to the international community 
that it was not ready to abolish the death penalty. This argument finds support in the fact 
that during the UPR, Ghana did not accept any death penalty recommendations made to 
it, most of which related to abolition of the death penalty.281 The second argument is that 
Ghana considers the granting of clemency in death penalty cases as the fulfilment of a 
domestic Constitutional requirement or as a Presidential goodwill gesture to 
commemorate a national day rather than as a fulfilment of its ICCPR obligations. The 
latter argument is more plausible. This is because in its Article 40 report to the CCPR in 
2014,282 Ghana reported on its use of the death penalty but not on its well-established 
practice of granting death penalty clemency, even though the granting of such clemency 
constitutes a measure giving effect to the rights recognised in Article 6(4).283  
3.2.3   Kenya 
 
Similar to Ghana, the President in Kenya is empowered by the Constitution to grant 
clemency for any offence or punishment.284 The clemency power is discretionary and 
exercised in accordance with the advice of an Advisory Committee, which comprises the 
Attorney-General, the Cabinet Secretary responsible for correctional service and at least 
five other members as prescribed by law.285 However, unlike in Ghana, Kenya’s 
Constitution expressly provides for how an individual can seek clemency. A petition for 
clemency can be made by ‘any person’ to the President.286 The ‘any person’ provision is 
unique because a person other than the prisoner or his representative can petition for 
clemency. This is an important intervention tool, which could be employed by interested 
parties to ensure that the right to seek clemency is enjoyed in Kenya. However, one 
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shortcoming of the Kenyan clemency constitutional provisions is that the Advisory 
Committee is permitted to consider the views of the victims of the offence in respect of 
which it is considering making recommendations to the President.287 This could 
potentially lead to clemency requests being influenced, to the detriment of the applicant, 
by victims of the offence who are still aggrieved, rather than the request being considered 
wholly on its merits.  
Scholars have written extensively on the role of victims in the criminal justice process.288 
For instance, Edwards has identified two types of victim participation in the criminal 
justice process: dispositive and non-dispositive.289 While dispositive participation 
involves the victim as the decision-maker, non-dispositive participation acknowledges 
the victim’s input in the process but without powers to override the decision.290 
Nevertheless, Manikis has argued for the expansion of Edwards’ model of victim 
participation by involving the victim as an agent of accountability.291 While the models 
put forward by Edwards and Manikis may be ideal during a criminal trial, including the 
conviction and sentencing process, it is not ideal during the clemency process in death 
penalty cases as it may defeat the essence of the process, which is to prevent the execution 
of the prisoner.  
The CCPR has gone some way towards addressing this issue in its recent draft General 
Comment on the right to life, where it emphasized that clemency procedures ‘should not 
afford the families of crime victims a preponderant role in determining whether the death 
sentence should be carried out.’292 However, what constitutes ‘a preponderant role’ may 
vary from country to country where culture and religion may constitute a factor. It is 
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therefore important for the CCPR to specify more precisely in its General Comment what 
role, if any, crime victims or their families should play in the determination of clemency. 
While the views of victims or their families may be valuable in clemency procedures, the 
decision to grant clemency should be based solely on the merits of the application.293 
Kenya being a party to the ICCPR has the obligation to give effect to Article 6(4).294 In 
the last decade it has done so by establishing itself as a leading death penalty clemency 
country in sub-Saharan Africa through the grant, on two occasions, of mass commutations 
to everyone on death row. In August 2009, the then President, Mwai Kibaki, granted the 
largest mass commutations in modern history when he commuted the death sentence of 
over 4,000 people to life imprisonment; this represented one fifth of the world’s death 
row population at that time.295 The President’s reason for the commutations was that the 
long period of time of waiting on death row to be executed caused ‘undue mental anguish 
and suffering, psychological trauma and anxiety.’296 The last execution in Kenya was 
carried out in 1987,297 since then there had been a significant increase in the death row 
population with many prisoners spending several years awaiting execution.  
At the time of the mass commutations, the London-based Death Penalty Project queried 
the President’s reason for the commutations. The organisation argued that the major 
underlying factor for the decision to commute the death sentences were the various legal 
challenges to the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya, which were 
before the domestic courts at the time.298 The Death Penalty Project, which had supported 
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and assisted in the filing of those cases, expressed the view that if the legal challenges 
had been successful, the Kenyan government would have had to hold resentencing 
hearings for each of the over 4,000 prisoners under sentence of death.299 This argument 
is speculative as there is no evidence to indicate that the mass commutations were granted 
because of those legal challenges. Moreover, the death row population in Kenya at that 
time was one of the largest in the world. This was so much a concern to the CCPR that it 
had called on Kenya to commute death sentences.300 The facts that Kenya had not 
executed anyone since 1987,301 the death row population was growing and Kenya did not 
wish to resume executions are plausible underlying factors for the mass commutations. 
President Kibaki’s rationale for granting the mass commutations is worth exploring 
because it is plausible to argue that it is rooted in the ‘death row phenomenon’ which has 
now become a doctrine of international human rights law in death penalty cases.302 The 
doctrine has its origins in the landmark case of Soering v UK which was decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1989.303 The Court decided that the extradition by 
the United Kingdom of a prisoner to face the death sentence in Virginia, USA, would 
breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights because his inevitable 
long wait on death row would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment. Before this case was decided, there had been no international case which 
expressly recognised the death row phenomenon as cruel or inhuman punishment.304 The 
judgment set a benchmark and a precedent for future cases, proof of its strong and 
continued relevance in international law.305 
Hudson has defined the death row phenomenon as ‘prolonged delay under the harsh 
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conditions of death row’, while emphasizing that neither prolonged delays or harsh 
conditions on their own are sufficient to constitute the phenomenon and that a 
combination of both is required.306 He opined that harsh conditions alone are not 
sufficient because they may be justified for security reasons and that prolonged delays 
may not necessarily have an adverse effect on the prisoner.307 However, by limiting the 
death row phenomenon to a combination of just two factors, Hudson’s definition runs the 
risk of overlooking the single impact of only one of the factors or other relevant factors 
which may well be important in establishing the phenomenon. Other relevant factors 
which should be considered include: uncertainty of the exact date of the impending 
execution; alternating hope and despair; and the feeling of isolation which may subject a 
prisoner to the death row phenomenon.308  
Since Soering, the death row phenomenon has been recognized as a violation of human 
rights by international and domestic tribunals. In 1993, the Judicial Committee of the 
Pricy Council in Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica309 applied the doctrine and went further 
by establishing the length of time on death row which will violate international human 
rights law. The Privy Council held that to execute a prisoner after a five-year wait would 
amount to inhuman and degrading punishment. This decision, especially the five-year 
rule, has also been applied in Belize in Mejia v Attorney General310 where the Supreme 
Court held that death sentences must be commuted to life imprisonment after the prisoner 
had been on death row for five years. In Uganda, with the same common law tradition as 
Kenya, the doctrine was recognised and applied in 2005 by the Constitutional Court in 
Kigula and 416 Others v. The Attorney General.311 The Court held that a ‘delay beyond 
3 years after the highest appellate court has confirmed the sentence’ constitutes cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment which is prohibited by the Ugandan Constitution.312 
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Seven years after the first mass commutations, a second one was granted by the current 
President, Uhuru Kenyatta. On 24 October 2016, he commuted the death sentence of all 
death row prisoners, a total of 2,747 at the time, to life imprisonment.313 Unlike the Kibaki 
mass commutations, no official reason was given for the Kenyatta mass commutations. 
Some analysts have argued that they may have been granted to make the President appear 
more compassionate ahead of the forthcoming Presidential election.314 The fact that no 
official reason was given for the commutations and that 102 other prisoners serving terms 
of imprisonment were pardoned at the same time gives this argument some credibility.  
However, a more compelling reason is that Kenya was again addressing the death row 
phenomenon by using mass commutations, which had been used previously to solve the 
same problem. Kenya was faced with the same issues as in 2009 when President Kibaki 
granted the first mass commutations – the death row population was growing, executions 
had not resumed, and hundreds of prisoners had already started spending long years on 
death row. In fact, in 2012, just five years after the first mass commutations, the death 
row population in Kenya had gone up from zero to 1,582.315 For the second time, the 
growing death row population gave the CCPR cause for concern and it reiterated its 
recommendation to Kenya to commute death sentences.316 The rapid rise in the death row 
population in Kenya over the years can be attributed to two factors. The first is that until 
December 2017, the death penalty was mandatory for murder,317 that meant judges had 
no discretion and were bound to impose death sentences when a person was found guilty 
of offences carrying the death penalty. Secondly, there is a high rate of ‘aggravated 
robbery’ and ‘attempted robbery with violence’ which are capital crimes.318  
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3.2.4   Nigeria 
 
Nigeria has consistently granted clemency to death row prisoners every year for the last 
10 years. The powers to grant clemency in Nigeria are vested in the President and the 
Governors of the 36 states that make up the Nigerian federation. The power and the 
procedure for granting clemency are provided in the Constitution.319 The President and 
the Governors are empowered to: grant a pardon, either free or subject to lawful 
conditions of any offence under the law; grant any person a temporary or permanent 
respite from the execution of a punishment and substitute a punishment with a less severe 
one and cancel the whole or part of punishment imposed on any person.320 
The grant of clemency to death row prisoners has been a common practice in Nigeria 
since the country returned to democratic rule in May 1999. In 2000, then President 
Olusegun Obasanjo pardoned all prisoners who had been on death row for 20 years and 
commuted to life imprisonment the sentences of prisoners who had been on death row for 
between 10 and 20 years.321 The clemencies were granted pursuant to Section 175 of the 
1999 Constitution which had been promulgated a few months earlier,322 but no official 
reason was given for the grant and the number of beneficiaries was not provided by the 
government. One commentator had suggested that the clemencies were granted by the 
government in the spirit of the new millennium.323 This may be the case as the clemencies 
were granted in January 2000. Nevertheless, they appeared to be an act of mercy to death 
row prisoners by a new President who himself had been convicted and sentenced to death 
in 1995 for a ‘coup d’état’ against the then military government.324 
Although these clemencies are laudable for saving some death row prisoners from 
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execution, their limitation to two categories of prisoners constitutes a breach of 
international human rights law. This is because Article 6(4) confers the right to seek 
clemency on ‘anyone sentenced to death’ and stipulates that clemency ‘may be granted 
in all cases’.325 In other words, the right and benefit of clemency should be applied to all 
without limitation or exception. In this case the clemency effectively excluded prisoners 
who had been on death row for less than 10 years. It also created unfairness, releasing 
completely from prison people who had spent more than 20 years on death row, while 
confining those who had spent between 10 and 20 years to a lifetime in prison and putting 
those who had spent less than 10 years on death row at risk of execution. The CCPR has 
declared that situations like this constitute deprivation of an effective remedy with respect 
to the right to seek clemency as protected by Articles 2 and 6(4) ICCPR.326 In an attempt 
to address this issue, the CCPR has stressed in its draft General Comment No. 36 that in 
respect of pardon and commutation for people sentenced to death, ‘no category of 
sentenced persons can be a priori excluded from such measures of relief, nor should the 
conditions for attainment of relief be ineffective, unnecessarily burdensome, 
discriminatory in nature or applied in an arbitrary manner.’327 It is therefore submitted 
that in cases where States Parties wish to grant death penalty clemency of their own 
initiative, rather than in response to request by a death row prisoner, the grant should be 
made to everyone on death row. Such an action, as exemplified in Kenya with the mass 
commutations, ensures that Article 6(4) is respected and fairness is upheld. 
Between 2008 and 2017, at least 365 death sentences were commuted and 148 pardons 
were granted to death row prisoners in Nigeria.328 The clemencies have been granted 
regularly every year across different states, mainly to commemorate two significant 
national holidays – Independence Day and Democracy Day.329 The consistent grant of 
clemencies is an indication that Nigeria’s clemency laws are being implemented, but this 
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does not necessarily mean that the implementation has been influenced by international 
human rights law. Nigeria’s clemency laws existed before the ICCPR was adopted in 
1966 and long before Nigeria acceded to the Covenant in 1993.330 The laws date back to 
the 1963 Constitution of Nigeria, the country’s first post-independence constitution. 
Section 101 of that Constitution provided for the clemency powers of the President with 
the same wording used in the 1999 Constitution. The original clemency provisions were 
also repeated in the 1979 Constitution, Nigeria’s second post-independence 
constitution.331 As the examples given above show, death penalty clemency in Nigeria is 
routinely granted pursuant to the country’s clemency laws, as an act of mercy by the 
Executive and in keeping with the tradition of granting them to mark national holidays 
and events. 
Nevertheless, there have been two instances where international human rights law has 
influenced the grant of death penalty clemency in Nigeria. In ThankGod Ebhos v Federal 
Republic of Nigeria , the plaintiff had been convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 
death in Kaduna State in 1995 by a tribunal established during military rule in Nigeria.332 
He was not allowed to appeal against his sentence or conviction. In 2013, the Nigeria 
Prisons Service, based on the 1995 conviction and death sentence, scheduled the 
execution of the plaintiff, alongside four other death row prisoners. While the prison 
authorities executed the other four prisoners on the appointed day, they could not hang 
the plaintiff because they discovered that his execution warrant had specified death by 
firing squad as the mode of execution. Subsequently, he filed a motion for an extension 
of time to submit an appeal to the Court of Appeal and followed that with an application 
for interim relief to the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). The plaintiff in his ECOWAS suit argued that the denial of his right 
to appeal in 1995 and the attempt to execute him without allowing him to exhaust his 
right of appeal constituted a breach of Nigeria’s international obligations on the right to 
a fair trial and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life under Articles 4 and 7 of the 
African Charter respectively. On 31 January 2014 the Court declared: ‘Where an 
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applicant is deprived of the process of an appeal after conviction and sentence of death, 
it may be an action of arbitrary deprivation of the right to life as envisaged by Article 4 
of the said Charter.’333 The Court also held that the plaintiff’s right of appeal guaranteed 
by Article 7 of the African Charter had been violated since he was denied a right to appeal 
against his conviction and death sentence.334  The Court ordered Nigeria to suspend the 
plaintiff’s death sentence and remove him from death row, pending the determination of 
the substantive court case.335  
In its address to the HRC on 20 March 2014, during the UPR, the Nigerian Government 
rejected all recommendations made to it concerning the death penalty, but in reference to 
the ThankGod Ebhos case stated that it would respect the ECOWAS Court order. 336 Some 
months after the statement, ThankGod Ebhos was released from prison pursuant to the 
clemency powers under section 212 of the Nigerian Constitution.337  
The statement of the Nigerian authorities during the UPR was significant. First, it was an 
acceptance of both the judgment and the international human rights law grounds on which 
the Court order was premised. Secondly, it represented an international commitment to 
implement the Court order. Although the Court judgment did not expressly order the grant 
of clemency, it is submitted that the grant of clemency to the plaintiff was an 
implementation of the judgment. This is because the only way, under Nigerian law, in 
which the Nigerian authorities could have removed the plaintiff from death row, without 
a court quashing the death sentence, was through the grant of clemency. Therefore, it 
seems clear that the ECOWAS Court’s findings of a violation of the African Charter 
influenced the Nigerian authorities to grant clemency to ThankGod Ebhos. 
In another case Moses Akatugba, at the age of 16, was arrested for stealing mobile phones 
in an armed robbery in 2005. After an eight-year trial, he was convicted and sentenced to 
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death by the High Court of Delta State, Nigeria.338 He maintained his innocence and 
alleged that he had been tortured by the police to make him sign two confessional 
statements.339 The case attracted the interest of Amnesty International, which launched a 
global petition for him.340 Over 36,000 Amnesty International members and activists 
petitioned the Governor of Delta State arguing, inter alia , that Moses Akatugba should 
not have been sentenced to death as he was a child at the time of his arrest and calling on 
the Governor to grant him clemency.341 Amnesty International argued that the death 
sentence imposed on Moses Akatugba was a breach of Nigeria’s obligations under Article 
6(5) of the ICCPR342 and Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).343 Nigeria is a party to both treaties and those provisions strictly prohibit the use 
of the death penalty against persons below the age of 18 at the time of the offence.344 On 
1 October 2014, some nine months after Amnesty International’s global petition was 
launched, the then Governor of Delta State, Emmanuel Uduaghan, publicly 
acknowledged the petitions at a state event and accepted that Moses Akatugba was a child 
at the time of the offence and that he was considering the case.345 On 28 May 2015, a day 
before leaving office and on the eve of the Democracy Day commemoration, the 
Governor granted Moses Akatugba a full pardon.346  
The Governor’s public response to the case suggests the impact of the thousands of 
petitions he had received. The Governor’s public acknowledgement that Moses Akatugba 
was 16 years old at the time of the crime was particularly vital to the case because it made 
it impossible for the government to deny a breach of Article 6(5) ICCPR and Article 37(a) 
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CRC, while at the same time strengthening the case for clemency. It is submitted that this 
fact would have crossed the mind of the Governor and, considering the petitions he had 
received, influenced his decision to grant clemency. This case highlights the important 
role human right organisations play in holding states accountable to their international 
human rights obligations. It also shows how specific provisions of international human 
rights law have influenced the decision to grant clemency. Without the ICCPR and the 
CRC’s prohibition on the use of the death penalty against people who were below 18 
years old at the time of the crime, the case for granting clemency to Moses Akatugba 
would certainly have been weaker and more difficult to justify. 
3.2.5   Zambia 
 
As the UN body that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR by States Parties, the 
role of the CCPR is significant because each State Party to the ICCPR is under the 
obligation to regularly submit reports to the CCPR on how it has implemented the rights 
contained in the Covenant, including the right to seek clemency under Article 6(4).347 The 
CCPR reviews each report, expresses its concerns and makes recommendations to States 
Parties in the form of a ‘concluding observation’.348 Since Zambia’s accession to the 
ICCPR,349 it has submitted three periodic reports to the CCPR on the measures it has 
taken to implement its obligations.350 Although Zambia has a tradition of commuting 
death sentences, which has been enabled by the clemency provisions of its constitution351 
and ‘noted with appreciation’ by the CCPR,352 the examination of Zambia’s last report 
by the CCPR has had a remarkable influence on the frequency and number of death 
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penalty clemencies granted.  
During the examination, the CCPR expressed concerns about the high number of people 
on death row in 2007. As a result, it recommended that Zambia ‘consider the commutation 
of the death sentences of all those currently on death row’.353 Since that recommendation 
in 2007, successive Zambian Presidents have granted clemency to an unprecedented high 
number of people on death row, and on one occasion to everyone on death row. President 
Levy Mwanawasa granted 124 clemencies,354 while President Rupiah Bwezani Banda 
granted 80.355 In May 2013, President Michael Sata commuted the death sentences of 113 
people to life imprisonment, and 10 more death sentences were commuted to life 
imprisonment, and one pardon granted, the following December.356 In July 2015, 
President Edgar Lungu commuted the death sentences of 332 people, the entire death row 
population at the time, to life imprisonment.357 From the time the recommendation was 
made until President Lungu’s mass commutation, 660 death penalty clemencies were 
granted in Zambia, compared to just 46 in the 10 year period before the recommendation 
was made.358  
Although Zambia is yet to submit its fourth periodic report indicating how it has 
implemented the CCPR recommendation, the increase in the grant of death penalty 
clemencies can be attributed to the latter’s influence. There are four indicators that 
support this conclusion. First, Zambia has an obligation as a State Party to the ICCPR to 
implement CCPR recommendations.359 The implementation of ICCPR rights constitutes 
the measures a State Party has adopted to give effect to provisions which it has agreed to 
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respect and fulfil, and shows the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights which is 
then reported to the CCPR pursuant to Article 40. In addition, the CCPR has emphasized 
that a State Party is required to take remedial action on its recommendations contained in 
concluding observations and that such recommendations constitute an authoritative guide 
for future laws, decisions and policies by that State Party.360  
Secondly, Zambia has a good record of implementing CCPR recommendations. A study 
by Heyns and Viljoen which investigated the impact that UN human rights treaties, 
including the ICCPR, have had on the realisation of human rights in States Parties found 
many examples of the recommendations of the CCPR ‘leading, directly or indirectly, to 
positive changes to law, policy and practice.’361 In the case of Zambia, the study reveals 
that in the only three communications where the CCPR found violations of the ICCPR 
against the country, the recommendations of the treaty body were implemented by 
Zambia and that the violations against affected individuals were redressed.362  
Thirdly, Zambia has strengthened the right to seek clemency in its domestic law. In its 
last report to the CCPR in 2006, Zambia explained that the clemency provision in its 
Constitution was the legislative measure it had adopted to give effect to the right to seek 
clemency under Article 6 ICCPR.363 Indeed, the Constitution which was adopted in 1991 
has been amended three times and the clemency provision has survived each 
amendment.364 The last amendment even witnessed a strengthening of the clemency 
provision. Prior to that amendment, the right to seek clemency was not expressly provided 
for but could only be inferred from the powers of the President to grant clemency.365 
However, following the 2016 amendment, the right to seek clemency from the President 
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was expressly included in the Constitution.366 In addition, Zambia recently reported to 
the HRC that its ‘commitment to uphold the protection and promotion of [international] 
human rights’ had motivated the 2016 amendment of the Constitution.367 
Lastly, ahead of its 2017 UPR, Zambia declared in its national report to the HRC that the 
mass commutations granted by President Sata and President Lungu were some of the 
progressive steps it had taken on the death penalty.368 This declaration was made in light 
of Zambia’s previous UPR in 2012 in which a recommendation on death penalty 
clemency was addressed to Zambia by the United Kingdom.369 By making the 
declaration, Zambia was demonstrating to the HRC and the international community that 
it had implemented the 2012 recommendation and had made progress in the enjoyment 
of the right to seek death penalty clemency. 
3.3   Conclusion 
  
This chapter has established that international human rights law has, to a large extent, 
influenced the use of the death penalty through the granting of clemency in the significant 
sub-Saharan African countries considered. Ghana’s law and practice of granting death 
penalty clemency clearly aligns with international human rights law, particularly, its 
obligations under Article 6(4) ICCPR; but there is no evidence to indicate that they were 
influenced by international human rights law. In contrast, the practice of granting death 
penalty clemency in Benin, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia has been influenced by 
international human rights law in various ways and to different degrees. The most 
discernible influence is evident in Benin where the government has acknowledged that 
ICCPR-OP2 caused it to commute the death sentences of all prisoners on death row. In 
Kenya, the death sentences of thousands of prisoners were commuted because of a 
doctrine of international human rights law. In addition, Zambia has remarkably increased 
the grant of death penalty clemency in response to the recommendations of the CCPR and 
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in fulfilment of its obligations under Article 6(4) ICCPR. While Nigeria has a good 
practice of granting death penalty clemency, the influence of international human rights 
law is evident only in two cases. Since the grant of death penalty clemency is 
discretionary, it may not always be granted to death row prisoners. The only guarantee 


















Abolition of the Death Penalty 
The grant of death penalty clemency, which was discussed in the last chapter, tends to 
obscure the fact that people sentenced to death often get executed. Every year, death row 
prisoners who have failed in their bid for clemency or been denied the right to seek it are 
executed in sub-Saharan Africa.370 For instance, at the end of 2017, 28 executions were 
recorded in sub-Saharan Africa – 24 in Somalia and 4 in South Sudan – and at least 4,187 
people were known to be under the sentence of death in the region.371 As long as the death 
penalty remains lawful, death row prisoners will remain at risk of being executed by the 
state. The only assurance against imposition of death sentences and executions is 
abolition of the death penalty. The abolition movement is now gaining momentum 
globally with an increasing number of countries prohibiting capital punishment.  
This chapter aims to demonstrate the extent to which international human rights law has 
influenced the abolition of the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa. Abolition is an 
important death penalty theme because it addresses all concerns about the use of capital 
punishment through its legal prohibition. Thus, its exploration is essential in investigating 
the extent to which international human rights law has influenced the law and practice of 
sub-Saharan African countries on the death penalty. 
There are two main sections in this chapter. The first section examines the death penalty 
abolition status of different countries and the criteria used in classifying them. The second 
section analyses the influence of international human rights law on the abolition of the 
death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa using four countries as case studies; and highlights 
countries in the region whose laws on abolition aligns with international human rights 
law but have not been influenced by it.    
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4.1   Classification of death penalty status 
 
In terms of their death penalty status, countries around the world are usually classified 
into four main categories – ‘abolitionist for all crimes’, ‘abolitionist for ordinary crimes 
only’, ‘abolitionist in practice’/ ‘abolitionist de facto’ and ‘retentionist’.372 Classification 
of the death penalty status of countries globally is important for this study on sub-Saharan 
Africa, not only as part of the wider context but also because it helps to understand the 
global trend towards abolition and determine whether a country has attained death penalty 
abolition status. It also serves as a useful tool for the purpose of advocacy against use of 
the death penalty. Therefore, it is not uncommon for international human rights 
organisations, the UN and other inter-governmental organisations to refer to these 
classifications in their discourse on the abolition of the death penalty.  
‘Abolitionist for all crimes’ are countries whose laws do not provide for the death penalty 
for any crime.373 In 1966, when the ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
only 26 countries had abolished the death penalty for all crimes;374 today there are 107.375 
‘Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only’ are countries whose laws provide for the death 
penalty only for exceptional crimes such as crimes under military law or crimes 
committed in exceptional circumstances such as wartime.376 Seven countries – Brazil, 
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Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Israel, Kazakhstan, Peru – currently belong in this 
category.377 It may seem that there is not much difference, in reality, between ‘abolitionist 
for all crimes’ and ‘abolitionist for ordinary crimes only’;378 perhaps because countries in 
the latter category have not used the death penalty for any crime in a long time and, in 
any case, can use it only for exceptional crimes, which rarely happens.379 However, as 
long as the death penalty remains in law, the possibility of its use cannot be ruled out. As 
Schabas notes: ‘Indeed, it is in time of war when the greatest abuse of the death penalty 
occurs. Criteria of expediency and State terror stampede panicked governments towards 
inhumane excesses unthinkable in time of peace.’380 This was certainly the case in 
Rwanda which vigorously used the death penalty against perpetrators of crimes 
committed during the 1994 Rwandan war and genocide.381 Rwanda and the use of the 
death penalty is considered in more detail below. 
‘Abolitionist in practice’, according to Amnesty International, ‘are countries which retain 
the death penalty for ordinary crimes such as murder but can be considered abolitionist 
in practice because they have not executed anyone during the past 10 years and are 
believed to have a policy or established practice of not carrying out executions; this 
category also includes countries which have made an international commitment not to 
use the death penalty.’382 However, the UN uses the term ‘abolitionist de facto’ instead, 
defining this group as:  
States and territories in which the death penalty remains lawful and death sentences 
may still be pronounced but executions have not taken place for 10 years. States 
and territories that have carried out executions within the previous 10 years but have 
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made an international commitment through the establishment of an official 
moratorium are also designated as ‘de facto abolitionist’.383 
Superficially, it appears that these two terminologies are the same because the criteria for 
both require the retention of the death penalty and the fulfilment of a 10-year rule. 
However, closer examination reveals certain differences.  
First, ‘abolitionist in practice’ is restricted to countries which retain the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes, thereby excluding countries that retain the death penalty for exceptional 
crimes. Whereas ‘abolitionist de facto’ is open to more countries, that is, all countries in 
which the death penalty remains in law and death sentences may be imposed. Secondly, 
in the ‘abolitionist in practice’ category the 10-year rule is qualified but this is not the 
case for ‘abolitionist de facto’. To qualify as ‘abolitionist in practice’, a country must, in 
addition to fulfilling the 10-year rule, be believed to have a policy or established practice 
of not carrying out executions. This additional requirement seems difficult to ascertain 
objectively since what constitutes a policy or established practice may vary from country 
to country, resulting in inconsistency in the classification of countries in this category. 
Thirdly, although both categories recognise, as an exception, countries that do not fulfil 
the 10-year rule but have made an international commitment against the death penalty, 
there is no clarity in the ‘abolitionist in practice’ criteria on what constitutes ‘international 
commitment’. The scope of ‘international commitment’ is essential in this context 
because the term is quite broad and may consist of the official pronouncement of a high-
ranking state official at an international event, an official report or response by a 
government before the UN or a regional inter-governmental organisation, or even an 
official declaration made internally but intended for the international community. For this 
reason, the ‘abolitionist de facto’ approach is preferred as it expressly specifies that the 
required international commitment must be made through the establishment of an official 
moratorium on executions.   
These differences explain why there is an inconsistency between the lists of ‘abolitionist 
in practice’ states and ‘abolitionist de facto’ states. While Amnesty International classify 
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29 countries as ‘abolitionist in practice’,384 the UN considers 51 as ‘abolitionist de 
facto’.385 This also explains perhaps why many writers on the death penalty prefer to use 
the ‘abolitionist de facto’ classification.386 
‘Retentionist’ countries are those which retain the death penalty in their law.387 Of all the 
categories, this is the easiest to ascertain. The main criterion is that the death penalty is a 
lawful punishment in the country. Amnesty International considers 56 countries as 
retentionist.388 The number of countries in this category can be used as a measure of 
progress on the global abolition of the death penalty, and advocates of abolition can rely 
on this when they state that only a minority of countries use of the death penalty. 
Despite the advantages of classifying the death penalty status of countries, however, the 
current classification is problematic. In all the abolitionist categories, only ‘abolitionist 
for all crimes’ can be considered truly abolitionist. ‘Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only’ 
and ‘abolitionist in practice’/ ‘abolitionist de facto’ still retain the death penalty in law to 
some degree, and to all intents and purposes either use or may use the death penalty - 
hence the retention of the punishment in law. This raises serious concerns about the 
commitment of countries in these categories to full abolition of the death penalty. 
‘Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only’ states, in reality, have not abolished the death 
penalty for exceptional crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and crimes 
committed in war time, and still have the potential to use the death penalty in those 
contexts.  
In addition, the classification of countries as ‘abolitionist in practice’/ ‘abolitionist de 
facto’ ignores the first fundamental element of the death penalty – imposition of death 
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sentences, and focuses too much on the second element – carrying out of executions. The 
10-year rule of both categories illustrates this point. Countries that have not carried out 
executions in the last 10 years and even those that have executed within that time frame 
but have made an international commitment to stop executing qualify as ‘abolitionist in 
practice’ and ‘abolitionist de facto’. The fact that the laws of these countries permit the 
use of the death penalty and the countries may or do impose death sentences is 
surprisingly not considered.389 These criteria appear to give more importance to 
executions over death sentences when in fact international human rights law provides 
equal safeguards to protect people facing both elements of the death penalty.390 
The retention of death penalty laws with the potential to invoke them or the act of 
imposing death sentences is anathema to the abolition of the death penalty even if no 
executions are carried out. This, coupled with the death row phenomenon and the real 
possibility of these countries resuming executions, is an anomaly which renders their 
classification as ‘abolitionist in practice’ or ‘abolitionist de facto’ flawed.  As Amnesty 
International rightly stated in its 1979 seminal work on the death penalty, ‘there is good 
reason for caution in classifying as abolitionist in practice any country which keeps the 
death penalty in law.’391 This position was borne out by examples at that time of countries 
which had not executed in a long time but subsequently resorted to the death penalty 
through the expansion of the scope of the punishment, the imposition of death sentences 
or the resumption of executions.392 In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon is 
just one example, out of many in the region, of the problematic nature of classifying 
countries in this way.393  
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Cameroon is currently classified as ‘abolitionist in practice’, following its reclassification 
from ‘retentionist’ in 2008.394 However the country’s abolitionist credentials are 
questionable. Cameroon has consistently abstained from voting on the bi-annual UN 
General Assembly resolution on a moratorium on the use of the death penalty.395 
Although an abstention is a less strong signal of disapproval than a ‘no’ vote,396 
Cameroon’s consistent abstentions indicate that it does not approve of the resolutions 
which are ultimately geared towards abolition of the death penalty. Also, Cameroon has 
rejected recommendations made to it on the abolition of the death penalty during two 
review cycles of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR).397 
On one occasion it strongly defended its retention of the death penalty, stating: ‘It [the 
death penalty] remains in the country’s legal armoury because of its dissuasive effect and 
public support for its retention. Cameroon rejects this [abolition] recommendation.’398 On 
another occasion it noted that the retention of the death penalty reflected the will of the 
people of the country which the government wanted to respect.399 Although the last 
execution in Cameroon occurred in 1997,400 the authorities have continued to impose 
death sentences. In the last few years the number of death sentences imposed has reached 
an unprecedented high level. Between 2015 and 2016 alone, 251 people were sentenced 
to death.401 This followed Parliament’s expansion of the scope of the death penalty to 
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include terrorism-related crimes.402 
One important fact is clear from the above analysis: states have either abolished the death 
penalty for all crimes in their law or still retain the death penalty in their law in one form 
or another. Against this background, it is arguably more appropriate to classify the death 
penalty status of countries into just two main categories – ‘abolitionist’ and 
‘retentionist’.403 Abolitionist can easily be categorized on the basis that only countries 
where the death penalty does not exist are truly abolitionist; and should not be further 
divided. Therefore, ‘abolitionist’ can be defined as countries where the death penalty is 
not lawful. The ‘retentionist’ category, however, requires further division and 
elaboration. It is essential to recognise that retentionist countries retain and engage with 
the death penalty in different ways. Some countries retain the death penalty in law but do 
not use it at all, some impose death sentences but do not implement them, while others 
impose death sentences and carry out executions. In that regard, retentionist countries can 
be divided into the following sub-categories: (1) Non-active retentionist: countries that 
retain the death penalty in law but have not used the death penalty in the past 10 years. 
(2) Non-executing retentionist: countries that retain the death penalty in law and have 
imposed a death sentence but have not carried out an execution in the past 10 years. (3) 
Active retentionist: countries that retain the death penalty in law, have imposed a death 
sentence and carried out an execution in the past 10 years, and do not have an official 
moratorium on executions or use of the death penalty.404 
The classification of the death penalty status of countries into ‘abolitionist’ and 
‘retentionist’ is particularly helpful, in the next section, to determine whether a sub-
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Saharan African country has attained death penalty abolition status. 
4.2 The influence of international human rights law on abolition in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
This section analyses the influence of international human rights law on the abolition of 
the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa, using four countries – South Africa, Rwanda, 
Madagascar and Benin – as case studies. Those countries were selected because they offer 
the best examples of the subject matter, are unique in the ways in which they achieved 
abolition and are representative of the two largest language blocs – Anglophone and 
Francophone – in the region. 
Of the 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 21 have abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes while the remaining 28 still retain the death penalty in law. The 21 abolitionist 
countries and their year of abolition are: Angola (1992), Benin (2016), Burkina Faso 
(2018), Burundi (2009), Cape Verde (1981), Congo (Republic of) (2015), Cote D'Ivoire 
(2000), Djibouti (1995), Gabon (2010), Guinea (2017), Guinea-Bissau (1993), 
Madagascar (2015), Mauritius (1995), Mozambique (1990), Namibia (1990), Rwanda 
(2007), Sao Tome And Principe (1990), Senegal (2004), Seychelles (1990), South Africa 
(1995) and Togo (2009).405  
The first set of countries in sub-Saharan Africa to abolish the death penalty were five 
former Portuguese colonies – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and São 
Tomé and Príncipe.406 By 1993, when abolition of the death penalty was still a rare 
occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa, all the Lusophone countries had outlawed the 
punishment. Cape Verde was the first to abolish the death penalty in the region. It 
achieved this through the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1981.407 In 1990, 
Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe also abolished the death penalty in their 
Constitutions.408 In 1992, Angola abolished the death penalty with the promulgation of 
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Constitutional Revision Law No. 23/92 of 16 September on the Prohibition of the Death 
Penalty.409 Guinea-Bissau completed this series of abolitions when it amended its 
Constitution in 1993.410  
Before considering the four case studies, it is important to explore what influenced the 
abolition of the death penalty in the five Lusophone countries because they pioneered 
abolition of the punishment in sub-Saharan Africa.  
4.2.1   The Lusophone countries 
 
A review of the constitutional reforms and political history of the five Lusophone 
countries does not reveal any influence of international human rights law on their 
abolition of the death penalty.411 A credible explanation is that the abolitions came at a 
time when abolition of the death penalty was not firmly rooted in international human 
rights law. By July 1991 when ICCPR-OP2 came into force, Cape Verde, Mozambique 
and São Tomé and Príncipe had already abolished the death penalty. Although four of the 
countries are now parties to ICCPR-OP2 and Angola is a signatory, this occurred long 
after they had abolished the death penalty.412Rather, abolition in these countries has been 
attributed to Portuguese colonial influence413 and there is evidence which supports this 
point. Since the middle ages, Portugal had rarely used the death penalty and usually only 
for treason.414 It last carried out an execution in 1849, abolishing the death penalty for 
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ordinary crimes in 1867 and for all crimes in 1976.415 Because of this, Portugal did not 
use the death penalty in its five African colonies.416 Following independence, Cape Verde 
did not include the death penalty in its criminal law.417 However, Angola, Guinea-Bissau 
and Mozambique did introduce the death penalty,418 and São Tomé and Príncipe was 
known to have carried out executions.419 Since the death penalty was not entrenched in 
the criminal systems of these countries throughout decades of Portuguese rule and was 
only used briefly by the post-independence regimes of four of the countries, it could be 
argued that there was no real appetite in the five countries to retain the death penalty. 
Therefore, when the opportunity of constitutional reform came, it was easy for them to 
expressly abolish the death penalty in law. 
4.2.2   South Africa 
 
In the landmark case of S v Makwanyane and Another,420 the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa considered the constitutionality of the death penalty following a referral by 
the Appellate Division which had upheld the death sentences imposed on two accused 
persons for murder. The Constitutional Court had to decide whether the imposition of 
death sentences for murder was cruel, inhuman and degrading, contrary to section 11(2) 
of the Interim South African Constitution 1993.421 Following a detailed consideration of 
the case, it held that the imposition of the death sentence as provided by Section 277 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977,422 was unconstitutional because it was 
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inconsistent with the fundamental human rights provisions – on the freedom from cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,423 the right of equality,424 the right to 
life425 and the right to human dignity426 – of the Constitution.427 The Court declared all 
laws imposing death sentences in South Africa unconstitutional and invalid. It ordered 
the government not to execute any person already under sentence of death and that their 
sentences be set aside and substituted with lawful punishments.428 The judgment, which 
effectively abolished the death penalty in South Africa, was implemented by the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 1997, which repealed section 277 and provided for resentencing.429  
The Makwanyane judgment was novel and marked the first time in sub-Saharan Africa 
that a court had abolished the death penalty. In addition, the case is very significant for 
this study because of the clear influence of international human rights law on the abolition 
of the death penalty in South Africa. Indeed, it appears to be the first time that such an 
influence was recorded in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa did not have a tradition of 
judicial review and there was limited domestic precedent on how to interpret the human 
rights enshrined in Chapter Three of the Interim Constitution.430 This difficulty was partly 
addressed in the Interim Constitution itself,431 which had already paved the way for the 
Constitutional Court to have recourse to international human rights law in the 
interpretation of the human rights provisions. Section 35 (1) stated: 
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In interpreting the provisions of this chapter, a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and 
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
protection of the rights entrenched in this chapter, and may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law.432 
The Constitutional Court clarified the scope of its reliance on international human rights 
law in Makwanyane, stating: 
In the context of section 35(1), public international law would include non-binding 
as well as binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools of 
interpretation. International agreements and customary international law 
accordingly provide a framework within which Chapter Three can be evaluated and 
understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable 
instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of 
Human Rights, and in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the 
International Labour Organisation may provide guidance as to the correct 
interpretation of particular provisions of Chapter Three.433 
In arriving at its decision, the Constitutional Court relied on the jurisprudence of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, although it noted that the Committee was prevented from 
declaring the death penalty to be a violation of the right to life because of Article 6(2) 
ICCPR.434 The Court specifically cited the Committee’s declaration in Chitat Ng v. 
Canada  that ‘by definition, every execution of a sentence of death may be considered to 
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 7 of the Covenant 
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[ICPPR].’435 On that basis it concluded that the taking of life ‘under such deliberate and 
calculated circumstances’ is a violation of the right to life because it constitutes cruel and 
inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 7. 
It is important to note that although Article 6(2) ICCPR allows the death penalty in certain 
circumstances for the ‘most serious crimes’, unlike the Committee the Constitutional 
Court did not allow itself to be constrained by that provision. Rather, it invoked Article 
6(6) of the ICCPR, which states that ‘nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or 
to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant’, 
as justification for its ground-breaking decision. In addition, in a manner which appears 
to justify why it took that approach, the Court stated that the ICCPR ‘tolerates but does 
not provide justification for the death penalty’ and therefore the Covenant’s provision on 
the death penalty had to be seen in that context.436 In that regard, the Court again found 
that the death penalty constitutes a violation of the right to life. It concluded that the death 
penalty violates the essential content of the right to life enshrined in the Interim South 
African Constitution in the sense that it extinguishes life itself.437 The Constitutional 
Court established that the right to life is a prerequisite for all other rights, since without 
life, in the sense of existence, it would be impossible to exercise other human rights or to 
be the bearer of them.438 It stressed that the purpose of the imposition of death sentences 
is to kill convicted criminals and that this amounts to the deprivation of existence which 
inevitably results in the denial of human life.439 As Obeng Mireju points out, the 
Constitutional Court effectively established that at the core of the constitutional right to 
life is an injunction against the state not to put anyone to death.440 
The approach taken by the Constitutional Court can be criticized for being subjective 
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because of the selective way in which it interpreted the international human rights law 
jurisprudence it relied on. For example, when considering the cases of Ng and Kindler , 
the Court singled out the Committee’s acknowledgement that the death penalty may 
constitute cruel and inhuman punishment to justify its decision. Yet it refused to follow 
and apply the conclusion of the Committee that the use of the death penalty in accordance 
with the requirements of the ICCPR does not constitute a breach of a country’s 
obligations. In addition, while the Court acknowledged that Article 6(2) to (5) of the 
ICCPR permits the imposition of death sentences for the most serious crimes, it did not 
apply those provisions in Makwanyane, in which the accused were guilty of grievous 
murders. Rather, it chose to apply Article 6(6) of the ICCPR, on the desirability of 
abolition, to support its decision. Such criticism was perhaps anticipated by the Court as 
Justice Mokgoro stated that, because court judgments are articulated and available for 
criticism and are based on acceptable sources in the form of applicable international and 
foreign precedent, the interpretation is not subjective.441 However, Abraham Klaasen 
considered that this argument was not entirely accurate. He pointed out that although the 
Court considered applicable international law and foreign law, it rejected sources that 
argued that the death penalty was an appropriate penalty.442 While this does not make the 
decision wrong or arbitrary, it is an indication of the role interpretative choice plays in 
choosing the sources of international law that will support a particular view.443 
The decision of the Constitutional Court in Makwanyane had the strong potential to 
become a persuasive authority for national courts in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly in countries with similarly framed right to life provisions.444 However, over 
two decades since Makwanyane, the Court’s decision is yet to serve as persuasive 
authority for national courts to abolish the death penalty in retentionist countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. At least two reasons can be given for this.  
First, there are no retentionist countries in sub-Saharan Africa with similar right to life 
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provisions to those in the then South African Interim Constitution. The constitutions of 
most retentionist countries in the region specifically allow for the use of the death penalty 
as an exception to the right to life. Secondly, the fact that the ICCPR expressly permits 
retentionist countries to use the death penalty for the most serious crimes weakens the 
persuasive authority of Makwanyane, thereby making it less convincing for a national 
court. Nevertheless, the Makwanyane decision shows that a national court can indeed be 
influenced by international human rights law when interpreting the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading punishment.445 In this light, Chenwi has argued that such 
interconnection between the international and domestic jurisprudence could be useful for 
African lawyers and courts in dealing with the death penalty.446  
Similarly, Nowak has stated that Makwanyane may serve as a precedent for the 
interpretation of Article 4 of the African Charter as an abolitionist provision.447 His 
argument is premised on the fact that the African Charter, like the then Interim South 
African Constitution, does not expressly recognise the death penalty as an exception to 
the right to life. However, there has not yet been any evidence of Makwanyane serving 
as a precedent for interpreting Article 4. No national or regional African court has relied 
on the decision to interpret Article 4. In addition, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), which has the mandate of interpreting the African 
Charter, has not used Makwanyane in its construction of Article 4. It was only in 2015 
that the African Commission, for the first time, interpreted Article 4 with reference to the 
death penalty. It declared that the African Charter does not include any provision 
recognising the death penalty, even in limited circumstances, but did not refer to 
Makwanyane.448 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the African Commission’s Working 
Group on the Death Penalty has referred to Makwanyane in its Study on the Question of 
the Death Penalty in Africa.449 The Working Group identified the case as a precedent for 
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abolitionists to argue that the death penalty is inconsistent with the right to freedom from 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.450  
It could be argued that Makwanyane has not served as a precedent for the interpretation 
of Article 4 because there is no direct similarity between the right to life provisions of the 
African Charter and those in the then Interim South African Constitution. It is for this 
reason that Van Zyl Smit contends that Nowak goes too far by drawing a direct parallel 
between Article 4 and the South African constitutional provision.451 He argues that 
although neither the African Charter nor the Interim Constitution refers directly to the 
death penalty, the latter is even more succinct than the former. Van Zyl Smit is of the 
view that ‘had the South African provision paralleled the African Charter more closely, 
some South African Constitutional Court judges may well have found that provision for 
the non-arbitrary deprivation of the right to life allowed the retention of the death 
penalty.’452 This is a plausible argument because unlike the South African right to life 
provision which is absolute and provides without qualification that ‘every person shall 
have the right to life,453 Article 4 qualifies the right to life by stating: ‘No one may be 
arbitrarily deprived of this right.’454 The use of the term ‘arbitrary’ is vital as it indicates 
that a person may be deprived of life as long as it is not arbitrary. 
4.2.3   Rwanda 
 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, following the 1994 genocide, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and international human rights law influenced 
Rwanda to restrict the imposition of death sentences.455 Despite the enactment of the 1996 
Organic Law,456 which made some restrictions possible, Rwanda continued to rigorously 
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use the death penalty. Twenty-two convicts were executed in 1998,457 and between that 
year and 2006 1,365 people were sentenced to death by the domestic courts.458 However, 
following the enactment of Organic Law Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic 
of Rwanda from the ICTR and from Other States (the Transfer Law) in March 2007,459 
the attitude of the Rwandan authorities to the use of the death penalty completely 
changed. On 25 July 2007, Parliament passed the Organic Law Relating to the Abolition 
of the Death Penalty (the Abolition Law).460 The Abolition Law abolished the death 
penalty for all crimes and replaced it with life imprisonment.461 
Considering the influence of international human rights law on the UN Security Council’s 
decision not to allow ICTR use the death penalty, and the ICTR’s subsequent requirement 
that the punishment could not be used for cases transferred to Rwanda, it is plausible to 
conclude that Rwanda’s complete abolition of the death penalty was a result of the trickle-
down influence of international human rights law. The following arguments support this 
conclusion. 
First, there was a domino effect. The UN Security Council’s exclusion of the death 
penalty from the ICTR’s jurisdiction caused the ICTR to include a no-death penalty 
condition in Rule 11bis, which then triggered Rwanda’s enactment of the Transfer Law 
and eventually led to a complete abolition of the punishment. Since the ICTR had no 
power to use the death penalty, and in light of the UN Security Council’s stance against 
the use of the death penalty during the negotiations to establish the ICTR, it was 
inconceivable that the Tribunal would have transferred cases to a country that used the 
death penalty. The ICTR’s concerns about Rwanda’s use of the death penalty impeding 
the transfer of cases had been quite evident some years before the enactment of the 
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Transfer Law. The ICTR President, Judge Erik Mose, in his first report to the UN Security 
Council on the implementation of Resolution 1503, stated that the ITCR had identified 
cases to transfer to Rwanda for trial but that ‘at the moment, transfer is made difficult by 
the fact that Rwandan law prescribes the death penalty as a sentence for certain crimes.’462 
In his second report, he again noted that: ‘Transfer of cases to Rwanda raises several 
issues. One involves the death penalty, which is applicable in genocide cases, though only 
rarely implemented.’463 Nevertheless, Judge Erik Mose’s acknowledgement of Rwanda’s 
initiation of a proposal, in 2006, to abolish the death penalty following the amendment of 
Rule 11bis,464 was a strong indication that the ICTR’s requirement had begun to influence 
Rwanda’s attitude towards abolition. Rwanda had always insisted that high-level persons 
accused of the 1994 genocide should be transferred and tried in Rwandan courts,465 so it 
stood to gain from fulfilling the ICTR’s requirement. If the country had not fulfilled the 
ICTR’s requirement, the ICTR would have been obliged under Rule 11bis to transfer the 
cases to another country.466  
Secondly, records of deliberations on the Abolition Law in the Rwanda Parliament 
indicate that the ICTR requirement influenced Members of Parliament (MPs) to 
eventually vote in favour of abolition.467 Two debates were held on 16 March and 7 June 
2007 before the Abolition Bill was enacted. The first was held on the same day that 
Parliament adopted the Transfer Law.468 The timing implies that the preparedness of 
Parliament to consider complete abolition of the death penalty was connected to the 
exclusion of the death penalty from cases transferred from the ICTR.469 Support for this 
conclusion is found in the records of the Parliamentary debate that day, which show that 
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the Minister of Justice, Tharcisse Karugarama, cited the exclusion of the death penalty 
from transferred cases as an argument in favour of complete abolition.470 The Minister 
stated that the adoption of the Transfer Law had created a contradiction in which the death 
penalty was not applicable to genocide-related cases transferred from the ICTR and other 
states, yet the punishment was applicable in domestic cases.471  
At the second debate, in a move that appeared to have persuaded MPs opposed to 
abolition, the Minister emphasized to Parliament that, after abolition, the worst genocide 
perpetrators, who would have been subjected to the death penalty under domestic law, 
would still be liable to severe punishment but in the form of life imprisonment with 
special provisions.472 In addition, the government pushed further on the need to resolve 
the contradiction by arguing that it was not equitable to use the death penalty against 
people who had committed less serious offences while those who had committed 
genocide would not be subject to the same punishment.473 That was a valid argument . If 
the contradiction had not been addressed through complete abolition, the worst 
perpetrators of the genocide transferred from the ICTR and other states would have 
escaped the death penalty, while perpetrators whose cases had originated in Rwanda and 
even those convicted of lesser, ordinary crimes would had the death penalty used against 
them. 
Thirdly, the Explanatory Note to the Draft Law Relating to the Repeal of the Death 
Penalty cited the right to life contained in the UDHR to justify abolition.474 In addition, it 
stated that there was ‘a push towards abolition from the UN and the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the fact that a large proportion of UN Member States 
have already repealed the death penalty.’475 
Fourthly, a 2016 qualitative empirical study which investigated post-genocide 
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reconciliation in Rwanda and the domestic effects of the ICTR found that the ICTR’s 
referral requirements had indeed influenced the abolition of the death penalty in 
Rwanda.476 People interviewed for the study, including Rwandan members of the ICTR, 
Rwandan lawyers and scholars, and foreign legal experts based in Rwanda all explicitly 
endorsed the view that Rwanda had abolished the death penalty to satisfy the ICTR’s 
referral conditions.477 One foreign legal expert, who was very much involved in Rwanda’s 
legal reforms of 2007, confidently stated that Rwanda had abolished the death penalty in 
order to meet the ICTR’s requirements and live up to all the international standards which 
the ICTR demands of a country to which genocide perpetrators are extradited.478 This 
opinion is corroborated by a Rwanda news report published shortly after the death penalty 
was abolished. The report stated:  
Sentencing convicts to death ended after the abolition of the death penalty, which 
was largely motivated by the government’s desire to have Genocide suspects 
extradited and be tried here. In February, Rwanda assured the international 
community that the death penalty will no longer be applied.479 
In addition, Stephen Rapp, a senior trial lawyer at the ICTR, was reported to have said 
that outlawing the death penalty considerably improved the chances of ICTR transferring 
cases to Rwanda. He had noted that ‘If Rwanda had not passed the law, it would not be 
possible [transferring suspects] because we could not send people knowing that they 
would face the death penalty.’480 
4.2.4   Madagascar 
 
The death penalty was introduced in Madagascar in 1958 by the French colonial 
authorities who carried out an execution in the same year.481 After independence, death 
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sentences were imposed but no executions were ever carried out.482 Abolition of the death 
penalty was considered by the government for many years but it never materialised.483 
Between 2005 and 2006 two abolition bills introduced in the National Assembly were 
rejected.484 There were security challenges and high level criminality in the south of the 
country due to an increase in the theft of cattle.485 Consequently, MPs from the south 
were persistently opposed to abolition and some had even called for the death penalty for 
the rape of minors.486 Madagascar’s reservations about abolition were evident at its first 
UPR where it rejected all recommendations to abolish the death penalty, stating: ‘the 
conditions for the immediate abolition of capital punishment do not yet exist. A 
significant proportion of the population and a majority of Members of Parliament believe 
that the deterrent effect of maintaining the death penalty is still a useful means of 
combating insecurity.’487 
However, after some years of political crisis following a 2009 coup d’état, the transitional 
government of President Rajoelina began to show an increased enthusiasm to consider 
abolition of the death penalty.488 This was most likely encouraged by the need to re-
establish relations with the international community, following the latter’s disapproval of 
the coup d’état, and the aspiration that human rights should be promoted in the country.489 
The country’s engagement with UN human rights mechanisms began to positively 
influence its attitude to abolition. 
In 2010, for the first time, Madagascar co-sponsored the UNGA death penalty 
moratorium resolution, and for the second time voted in favour of it.490 Co-sponsors of 
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UNGA resolutions are primarily co-authors of it and co-sponsorship signifies strong 
agreement with the substance of the resolution.491 Therefore, Madagascar’s action 
indicated its agreement with the abolition calls contained in the resolution.492 In addition, 
on 24 September 2012 President Rajoelina signed ICCPR-OP2.493Although simply 
signing a human rights treaty which, like ICCPR-OP2, requires ratification does not 
express the state’s consent to be bound,494 it demonstrates the state’s intent to examine 
the instrument with a view to ratifying it.495 In this context, Madagascar was arguably 
signalling its eventual commitment to abolition. More importantly, by becoming a 
signatory to ICCPR-OP2, Madagascar was obliged, in the period between signature and 
ratification, to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the 
Protocol.496 Furthermore, in December 2012 Madagascar again co-sponsored and voted 
in favour of the third UNGA death penalty moratorium resolution,497a further sign of its 
commitment to abolition. At the time of its second UPR, on 3 November 2014, the 
influence which UN human rights mechanisms had had on Madagascar’s attitude to 
abolition was evident. For the first time, it accepted all recommendations to abolish the 
death penalty,498 had no reservations about abolition and did not seek to justify retention 
of capital punishment despite continued opposition to abolition in the south of the 
country.499  
A few weeks later, a short Abolition Bill, containing only four sections, was personally 
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introduced in Parliament by Jean Max Rakotomamonjy, President of the National 
Assembly.500 The influence of international human rights law in the drafting of the bill 
was obvious. The explanatory statement accompanying the Bill began with a reference to 
key provisions of the UDHR: Article 3, the right to life, and Article 5, the right to freedom 
from torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatments.501 The statement ended: 
Any country committed to liberty and ethics must pronounce itself, without any 
ambiguity, against the death penalty. Madagascar has already demonstrated this 
willingness by signing in September 2012 the Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. 
It is time to translate this willingness into law. This is the purpose of the present 
Bill.502 
The anticipated opposition from southern MPs was apparent during the Parliamentary 
committee’s consideration of the Bill. However, the fact that these MPs were in a minority 
appeared to have eliminated the opposition.503 When the Bill was put to a plenary vote on 
10 December 2014, the National Assembly unanimously adopted it.504 On 9 January 
2015, the Bill was signed into law by the President.505 Article 1 provides: ‘The death 
penalty is abolished. No-one can be executed.506 The punishment was replaced by life 
imprisonment with hard labour.507 Subsequently, Madagascar ratified ICCPR-OP2 on 21 
September 2017. 
4.2.5   Benin 
 
The influence of ICCPR-OP2 on the Constitutional Court’s restriction of death sentences 
and the government’s grant of clemency to all death row prisoners in Benin is well 
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established.508 However, a major question which these developments pose is: what is the 
death penalty status of Benin?  
Hood and Hoyle have opined that Benin effectively abolished the death penalty when it 
acceded to ICCPR-OP2 in 2012.509 They do not provide further reasoning for their 
opinion. However, subsequent proponents of this view have argued that abolition 
occurred because Benin is a monist state,510 and as such ICCPR-OP2 was automatically 
incorporated and took effect in the country’s national law upon accession.511 In addition, 
they rely on the 2012 Constitutional Court decision in support of their position.512 Benin 
is indeed a monist state and this status is confirmed in the Constitution which gives 
treaties, lawfully ratified by Benin, superior authority over national laws.513 Nevertheless, 
the conclusion that Benin’s accession to the ICCPR-OP2 abolished the death penalty in 
the country is legally flawed. 
First, as already discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, ICCPR-OP2 does not actually abolish the 
death penalty but sets abolition as its goal. Article 1(1) provides that ‘no one in the 
jurisdiction of a State Party to the Protocol shall be executed’, while Article 1(2) 
stipulates: ‘Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty 
within its jurisdiction.’ This clearly indicates that ICCPR-OP2 imposes an obligation on 
a State Party to ensure abolition of the death penalty and does not automatically abolish 
the death penalty in its jurisdiction. One probable reason for the assumption that ICCPR-
OP2 abolishes the death penalty on ratification or accession is that 81, a clear majority, 
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of the current 85 States Parties are abolitionist.514 However, it must be emphasized that 
many of these states became parties to the Protocol after abolition had already taken place 
in their countries.515 
Secondly, analysis of the 2012 Constitutional Court judgment indicates that it applies 
only to the adoption of the Criminal Procedure Code and not to the general use of the 
death penalty in Benin.516 The case arose from the request of the President to the 
Constitutional Court to determine whether the new Criminal Procedure Code passed by 
the National Assembly was compliant with the Constitution. Consequently, the 
Constitutional Court, among other things, declared Articles 685(2) and 793, which 
provided for death sentences, unconstitutional because they were incompatible with 
Benin’s accession to ICCPR-OP2. Thus, the contravening provisions of the law were 
removed by the National Assembly, but provisions on the death penalty remained in the 
Criminal Code.517 
Nevertheless, an examination of the 2016 Constitutional Court decision sheds light on the 
current abolitionist status of Benin. The decision went further in scope than the 2012 one, 
unequivocally declaring that Benin’s accession to ICCPR-OP2 ‘now renders inoperative 
all legal provisions stipulating the death penalty as a punishment…such that no one can 
now be sentenced to capital punishment in Benin.’518 By virtue of the Constitutional Court 
being the highest court and authority on constitutional matters,519 this decision is final 
and binding in Benin. Therefore, it can be concluded that the death penalty is no longer 
lawful in Benin and the country is an abolitionist state. Furthermore, since the 
Constitutional Court premised its 2016 decision on Benin’s accession to the ICCPR-OP2, 
it is reasonable to conclude that international human rights law influenced Benin’s 
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abolition of the death penalty. 
5.3   Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the extent to which international human rights 
law has influenced the abolition of the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter 
has demonstrated that international human rights law influenced abolition of the death 
penalty in South Africa, Rwanda, Madagascar and Benin. However, as the analysis of the 
Lusophone countries in the region indicate, abolition of the death penalty in some sub-
Saharan African countries only aligns with international human rights law and the 
influence of that body of law is not evident. In those Lusophone countries, Portuguese 
colonialism influenced abolition. Thus, international human rights law has influenced 
abolition of the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa to some extent. Nevertheless, the 
extent of that influence is significant.  The ICCPR and the jurisprudence of the CCPR 
provided the Constitutional Court of South Africa with grounds it needed to declare the 
death penalty unconstitutional. In this regard, Article 6(6) ICCPR was a useful tool for 
the Court. This also proves that although the Covenant allows for the death penalty in 
limited circumstances, it is a progressive abolition instrument which could be relied on to 
achieve abolition of the death penalty. The influence of ICCPR-OP2 on the Benin 
Constitutional Court’s decisions shows the effectiveness of the instrument in having far-
reaching positive outcomes for abolition in the jurisdiction of States Parties. As the case 
of Madagascar shows, even when a country is simply a signatory, ICCPR-OP2 can still 
inspire abolition. It is hoped that the 2016 decision of the Benin Constitutional Court will 
serve as precedent in other countries that become a party to ICCPR-OP2 but delay in 
fulfilling their obligations to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty. 
International human rights law’s relationship with the abolition of the death penalty is 
dynamic. Beyond the obligations it directly imposes on States Parties to abolitionist 
instruments, its general application by states in the context of UN mechanisms and 
institutions can influence countries to abolish the death penalty, as was the case in 





The aim of this study has been to investigate the extent to which international human 
rights law has influenced the law and practice of sub-Saharan African countries on the 
death penalty. This study is important because the death penalty remains lawful in the 
majority – 28 of 49 – countries in sub-Saharan Africa contrary to international trends 
which indicate that 107 countries – a majority – in the world have abolished the 
punishment. Also, the lives of convicts are protected against the death penalty in 21 sub-
Saharan African countries but could be lawfully taken in 28 others, creating a kind of 
lottery with regard to respect for the right to life in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the 
propensity of sub-Saharan African countries to implement death sentences makes the 
situation even more concerning.  
5.1   Principal findings of the study 
 
Why the African Charter, Africa’s main human rights instrument, is silent on the death 
penalty is an important question in the study of the death penalty; but one which scholars 
have not yet been able to properly explain. Rather than provide reasons for the silence, 
scholars have simply been using Article 4 of the African Charter, which prohibits the 
arbitrary deprivation of life, to draw inferences on the Charter’s position on the death 
penalty. Indeed, William Schabas was right in observing that there is paucity of available 
materials on the drafting history of the African Charter.520 This makes it difficult, but not 
impossible, to understand the Charter’s silence on the death penalty. This study has shown 
that the available drafting history sheds light on the Charter’s silence. The drafters of the 
Africa Charter were determined to make the instrument unique, hence they did not simply 
replicate provisions from the other international human rights instruments. They had the 
opportunity to include a provision on the death penalty, in fact the first draft contained 
such a provision, but they intentionally left it out of the final draft. Besides, no country in 
Africa had abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1979, when the Charter was being 
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drafted, so the restriction or abolition of the punishment was not a major human rights 
priority for Africa at that time.  
What emerged out of a desire to be original has turned out to be a flaw. The African 
Charter’s failure to regulate the use of the death penalty has made the instrument weak in 
addressing concerns about the punishment. In particular, at a time when international 
human rights law is moving towards abolition of the death penalty, the African human 
rights system is lagging behind. A human rights system must be relevant and continuously 
adapt to match changing conditions,521 but the African human rights system has been slow 
to do this with regard to the death penalty. An instrument which comprehensively 
addresses the question of the death penalty in Africa is urgently required. To this end, the 
African Union should without further delay consider and adopt the draft Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Abolition of the Death Penalty, which has been pending before it 
since 2015. 
This study has found that international human rights law has influenced the law and 
practice of sub-Saharan African countries on the death penalty to a large extent in three 
distinct ways: restricting the imposition of death sentences, preventing executions 
through the grant of clemency and abolishing the death penalty. 
The mandatory imposition of death sentences has been declared unconstitutional by 
national courts in Malawi and Kenya using international human rights law as tools for 
interpreting the Constitution.522 Constitutional provisions on the right to equality before 
the law, freedom from discrimination and the right to a fair trial have all been construed 
with reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)523 and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)524 in order to invalidate laws which 
provided for the mandatory imposition of death sentences. Consequently, in these 
countries, judges now have the discretion not to impose death sentences and are permitted 
to take into consideration mitigating circumstances during sentencing in individual 
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capital cases. Although the death penalty remains a lawful punishment there, the 
prohibition of mandatory death sentences has resulted in the courts ordering the 
establishment of resentencing hearings to review all death sentences. In Malawi, the 
resentencing hearings have led to the substitution of death sentences with prison terms 
and in some cases the immediate release of prisoners. The sentencing discretion that 
judges now have would arguably reduce the number of death sentences imposed. 
In Benin, an examination of two landmark Constitutional Court judgments has shown 
how the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (ICCPR-OP2)525 was used to justify 
restricting the imposition of death sentences.526 Although ICCPR-OP2 does not expressly 
preclude State Parties from imposing death sentences, it was initially used by the 
Constitutional Court to nullify a section of a new law providing for death sentences. The 
same instrument was subsequently used by the Court as ground for invalidating all 
existing death penalty laws in Benin, to the extent that prosecutors can no longer request 
the courts to impose death sentences in criminal cases and all courts have been banned 
from imposing such sentences. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, both set up by the UN, have played significant roles in restricting the imposition 
of death sentences in Rwanda and Sierra Leone respectively.527 The ICTR could not 
impose death sentences for crimes, even though such crimes were punishable with the 
death sentence under Rwandan law.528 Similarly, the Special Court cannot impose death 
sentences despite the availability of the punishment in Sierra Leonean law.  The UN’s 
resolve to exclude the death sentence from the punishments the ICTR and Special Court 
could use stemmed from international human rights law which unequivocally no longer 
permits the imposition of death sentences for international crimes.  
In addition, the study has found that the right of people under sentence of death to seek 
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clemency is well established in international human rights law.529 UN and regional human 
rights instruments, UN bodies and experts and international human rights tribunals have 
all contributed significantly to entrenching the right in the jurisprudence of international 
human rights law.  
Countries across sub-Saharan Africa have established a practice of granting death penalty 
clemency. The common feature of the five significant countries examined in this study is 
that they have provisions in their domestic law which facilitate the grant of death penalty 
clemency and have consistently granted it to many or all people on death row.530 In many 
cases the clemency granted to death row prisoners has been influenced by international 
human rights law. The extent of that influence has been diverse across the five countries 
examined. At one end of the spectrum is Ghana, which has a good record of granting 
clemency to death row prisoners but has done so in fulfilment of its own clemency laws 
and its tradition of granting clemency to commemorate national days, with no discernible 
influence of international human rights law. At the other end of the spectrum are Benin, 
Kenya and Zambia that have clearly been influenced by international human rights 
treaties, doctrine and treaty implementation review mechanisms in granting death penalty 
clemency.531 Nigeria falls in the middle of this influence spectrum, while it has regularly 
granted clemency to death row prisoners, its decisions have largely been influenced by 
the discretion of the executive to show mercy to death row prisoners; although 
international human rights law has played a major role in influencing the decision to grant 
clemency in two cases.532 
The influence of international human rights law on the grant of death penalty clemency 
in sub-Saharan Africa has been quite remarkable, resulting in thousands of people being 
spared death. It has also altered the way in which some countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
use the death penalty; that is, it has prevented them from implementing death sentences. 
In the absence of clemency, it is undeniable that in sub-Saharan Africa many people 
sentenced to death who have exhausted or been denied their right of appeal would 
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languish on death row always at risk of execution. 
Of the 21 abolitionist countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa, Rwanda, 
Madagascar and Benin offer the best examples of the influence of international human 
rights law on abolition. The South African case of Makwanyane533 has been ground-
breaking in sub-Saharan Africa on two fronts. First, it marked the first time a court in the 
region had abolished the death penalty. Prior to Makwanyane, abolition had only been 
achieved in 9 countries in the region, but through direct legislative changes.534 Secondly, 
it marked the first discernible influence of international human rights law on abolition in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The Constitutional Court in Makwanyane was faced with the 
dilemma of interpreting the human rights provisions of the Constitution with regards to 
its law on the death penalty but had very limited domestic precedent to rely on. 
International human rights law became the interpretative tool which enabled the Court to 
abolish the death penalty. At that time, South Africa’s law on the death penalty was quite 
clear on the validity of the punishment. It is inconceivable that the Constitutional Court 
would have had the legal justification to interpret the Constitution to abolish the death 
penalty without Article 6(6) ICCPR and the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee.  
ICCPR-OP2 has proved to be an effective abolitionist instrument in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It has been unique in influencing the abolition of the death penalty in three sub-Saharan 
African countries. The entry into force of ICCPR-OP2 in 1991 set international human 
rights law on a trajectory towards the abolition of the death penalty. The implications of 
this for the ICTR and Rwanda have already been noted. Also, the abolition of the death 
penalty in Madagascar on account of it being a signatory to ICCPR-OP2 shows how 
influential the instrument can be even in a signatory state.535 For Benin, accession to 
ICCPR-OP2 was the impetus that made abolition possible.536 The Constitutional Court’s 
use of ICCPR-OP2 as the sole justification for the effective abolition of the death penalty 
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in Benin was unprecedented and has established a persuasive legal precedent which may 
influence the national courts of other States Parties.  
The general classification of the death penalty status of countries is particularly useful in 
understanding the global trend towards abolition and determining whether a country has 
attained death penalty abolition status. However, the way in which scholars and anti-death 
penalty organizations classify countries as ‘abolitionist for all crimes’, ‘abolitionist for 
ordinary crimes only’, ‘abolitionist in practice’/ ‘abolitionist de facto’ and ‘retentionist’ 
has been challenged in this study. The classification is subjective, inconsistent and 
appears to give more importance to executions over imposition of death sentences. To 
rectify these flaws, the classification of countries into just two main categories – 
‘abolitionist’ and ‘retentionist’ – was considered to be more appropriate.537 Furthermore, 
three new sub-categories and definitions for the ‘retentionist’ category were proposed: 
(1) Non-active retentionist: countries that retain the death penalty in law but have not 
used the death penalty in the past 10 years. (2) Non-executing retentionist: countries that 
retain the death penalty in law and have imposed a death sentence but have not carried 
out an execution in the past 10 years. (3) Active retentionist: countries that retain the 
death penalty in law, have imposed a death sentence and carried out an execution in the 
past 10 years, and do not have an official moratorium on executions or the use of the 
death penalty.538 
5.2   Influence versus alignment 
  
The fact that a country’s law or practice on the death penalty aligns with international 
human rights law does not of itself prove that the latter has influenced the former. 
International human rights law must have had a discernible effect on a country’s decision 
to restrict or prohibit the use of the death penalty for influence to be established. Besides 
finding clear evidence of influence, this study has found instances of the death penalty 
law or practice of sub-Saharan African countries merely aligning with international 
human rights law but with no discernible evidence of the latter influencing the former. 
For instance, in Zimbabwe, the Constitution prohibits the imposition of a death sentence 
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on a person below 21 years old when the offence was committed.539 This clearly aligns 
with Zimbabwe’s obligations under Article 6(5) ICCPR and Article 37(a) Convention on 
the Right of a Child,540 which strictly prohibits the imposition of death sentences for 
crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age.541 However, there is no evidence in 
the drafting history of the Zimbabwe Constitution that international human rights law 
influenced that provision.542 On the contrary, Zimbabwe has a legal history and practice 
of not imposing death sentences against juveniles, and this precedes its accession to the 
ICCPR and the CRC. The juvenile age had long been set at 18 in the laws of Zimbabwe 
until the 2013 Constitution increased it to 21.543  
Similarly, the right to seek death penalty clemency had been established in the 
‘prerogative of mercy’ law of Ghana before the ICCPR came into force in 1976.544 
Moreover, the practice of granting death penalty clemency in Ghana, already discussed 
in chapter 3, is further evidence of alignment with international human rights law rather 
than influence by it.545 
Since international human rights law sets abolition of the death penalty as a goal, it could 
be argued that the death penalty abolition status of the 21 sub-Saharan African abolitionist 
countries aligns with international human rights law. However, of these 21 countries, this 
study found discernible influence of international human rights law on death penalty 
abolition in Benin, Madagascar, Rwanda and South Africa. It has been shown that 
Portuguese colonialism influenced abolition in the five Lusophone sub-Saharan African 
countries.546 With regard to Namibia, the only other Anglophone abolitionist country in 
sub-Saharan Africa besides South Africa, death penalty abolition occurred on 
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independence from apartheid South Africa. The arbitrary and repressive use of the death 
penalty during apartheid colonial rule in Namibia influenced the abolition of the death 
penalty in the independence Constitution.547 The death penalty was clearly a serious 
concern shortly before independence as it was one of the main matters debated by the 
drafters of the Constitution.548 This concern became apparent in 1994, four years after 
independence, during a UN General Assembly debate on the death penalty. Namibia’s 
representative, while emphasizing that Namibians consider the right to life to be the most 
important human right, stated that ‘the historical perspective and the social, cultural and 
political reality of Namibia prior to independence had played a major role in shaping its 
Constitution… Capital punishment was therefore clearly and expressly banned by the 
Constitution.’549 The emphatic words used to abolish the death penalty in the Namibian 
Constitution undoubtedly confirm this point and indicate the determination of the drafters 
to rid Namibia of the punishment. 550  
In the remaining 11 countries (all Francophone),551 there is no clear indication that 
international human rights law influenced abolition of the death penalty. Factors that 
influenced abolition appear to include a strong political will of the government – 
characterized by Presidential opposition to the death penalty; grant of mass death penalty 
clemency; rare use of the death penalty; establishment of moratoria against executions; 
post-conflict resolution mechanisms and antipathy towards executions.552 
5.3   Limitations of this research 
 
Although this study has achieved its aim, it has certain limitations. In particular, it was 
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based on a selection of countries in sub-Saharan Africa; it was restricted by the paucity 
of published official documents of sub-Saharan African countries on the death penalty; 
and it has mainly been conducted in English in a region with multiple official languages. 
An analysis of every country in sub-Saharan Africa is beyond the scope of this study. The 
study focused mainly on 10 countries in that region. As a result, not all the trends in the 
law or practice of all 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa could be considered and 
analysed. Thus, there is a risk that the influence that international human rights law has 
had on the death penalty in countries other than those considered has been missed. In 
addition, the paucity of published official documents on the death penalty in sub-Saharan 
Africa made the evaluation of a wider pool of countries impossible. Official government 
documents on the death penalty, for example the record of legislative proceedings and 
executive decisions, are quite important in understanding a country’s law and practice. 
Unfortunately, many sub-Saharan African countries have not made these documents 
publicly and widely available. Also, they do not always fulfil their obligations to report 
their practice concerning the death penalty to the UN as required under Article 40 of the 
ICCPR.553 Furthermore, this study was primarily conducted in English in a region with 
multiple official languages which include English, French, Portuguese, Spanish and 
Arabic. Except for some sources in French which were translated into English, the study 
examined only literature in English. Considering that the majority of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa are not Anglophone, there may well be literature in other official 
languages which has not been accessed but which could shed more light on the research 
question. For future research on the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa, an examination 
of literature written in the official language(s) of the countries of study and an in-country 
sourcing of official government documents on the subject are recommended. This will 
ensure that the research limitations highlighted above are surmounted.  
5.4   Suggestions for future research 
 
Although ICCPR-OP2 has been influential in restricting and abolishing the death penalty 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the extent of ratification of / accession to this important instrument 
in the region is still low. Only 14 countries – 28 per cent – in sub-Saharan Africa are 
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parties to the Protocol and seven countries that have already abolished the death penalty 
are not parties.554 It is important for countries that have already abolished the death 
penalty to become parties to the ICCPPR-OP2 because it indicates a firm commitment of 
those countries to abolition and not to re-introduce the death penalty since ICCPR-OP2 
does not provide for the withdrawal of States Parties. Moreover, an increase in the number 
of States Parties strengthens the abolition movement’s position that support for abolition 
is increasing globally. Therefore, future researchers could examine the factors preventing 
sub-Saharan African countries, particularly those that have already abolished the death 
penalty, from becoming parties to the ICCPR-OP2. 
Also, only 2 Anglophone countries – Namibia and South Africa, both of which have a 
history of apartheid – have abolished the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa.555 This is 
concerning because people in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa are less protected against 
the death penalty than people from other major language blocs in the region. This 
provides an opportunity for research on why the Anglophone countries are lagging behind 
and insights from the Francophone and Lusophone countries that could be useful in 
abolishing the death penalty in Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa.   
More broadly, it can be seen from this study that the UN is opposed to the death penalty. 
Nearly three decades since ICCPR-OP2 was adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
however, the death penalty has not been completely abolished in international law. 
Further research is needed on why the UN has not yet adopted a treaty on the complete 
abolition of the death penalty. 
5.5   Practical implication of the research 
 
This study provides a contribution to existing knowledge of the death penalty in sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly on the influence of international human rights law on the use 
of the death penalty in that part of the world. The study has proved that international 
human rights law is effective against the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa. Human 
rights scholars, anti-death penalty advocates, campaigning organisations, lawyers and 
                                                     
554
 The seven countries are Angola (currently a signatory to ICCPR-OP2); Burundi; Congo (Republic of); 
Cote d’Ivoire; Guinea; Mauritius and Senegal. 
555
 Five Lusophone and 14 Francophone countries are abolitionist. 
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governments will benefit from the additional insights this research provides. The research 
will serve as a useful authority to human rights scholars on the arguments, trends and 
developments on the death penalty in sub-Saharan Africa which will inform and shape 
scholarly discourse and literature. Also, it will serve as resource for anti-death penalty 
advocates and campaign organisations in developing effective strategies against the death 
penalty. In death penalty cases, lawyers can replicate the successful international human 
rights law arguments highlighted in this study. Furthermore, courts and other government 
authorities in retentionist countries can rely on the various court judgments and 
government decisions examined in this study as precedent for restricting the use or 
abolishing the death penalty.  
Sub-Saharan Africa has the potential to become completely free of the death penalty. In 
this regard, increased adherence to international human rights law by retentionist 
countries in the region, the adoption of an African regional abolitionist instrument by the 
African Union, and strategic litigation with recourse to international human rights law are 














African Human Rights System Documents 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Declaration of the Continental 
Conference on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa (the Cotonou Declaration)’, 
4 July 2014 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Final Communiqué of the 56th 
Ordinary Session’, 7 May 2015   
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Resolution calling on State Parties 
to Observe the Moratorium on the Death Penalty’, ACHPR/Res.136 (XXXXIIII) 08 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Resolution Urging States to 
Envisage a Moratorium on Death Penalty’, ACHPR /Res.42(XXVI)99 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Study on the Question of the Death 
Penalty in Africa’, 10 April 2012, adopted by the African Commission at its 50th 
Ordinary Session (24 October - 07 November 2011) 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, General Comment No. 3 on the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4) 
African Union Constitutive Act 
Books 
Amnesty International, When the State Kills: The Death Penalty v Human Rights (United 
Kingdom, Amnesty International 1989) 
Bankole T, The Criminal Law of Sierra Leone (University Press of America 1999)  
Baricako G, ‘Introductory Preface: The African Charter and African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights’ in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds), The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice 1986–2006 (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2008) 
115 
 
Coates T, Convict Labour in the Portuguese Empire: 1740-1932 (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Brill, 2014) 
Chenwi L, Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa: A Human Rights 
Perspective (Pretoria, Pretoria University Law Press 2007) 
Destexhe A, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (London, Pluto, 1995) 
Elias T, The nature of African customary law (Manchester University Press 1956) 
Freedman R, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early 
Assessment (Hoboken, Taylor and Francis 2013) 
Freeman M and Pensky M, ‘The Amnesty Controversy in International Law’ in Francesca 
Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (eds), Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability: 
Comparative and International Perspective (Cambridge 2012) 
Hatchard J and Coldham S ‘Commonwealth Africa’ in Hodgkinson P & Rutherford A 
(eds) Capital punishment: Global issues and prospects (Winchester: Waterside Press 
1996) 
Hood R and Hoyle C, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2015) 
Jallow H B, The Law of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(Victoria, 2007)  
Mogwe A, ‘The Death Penalty in Botswana: Barriers to Equal Justice’ in Ivan Simonovic 
(eds), Moving Away from the Death Penalty: Arguments, Trends and Perspectives 
(United Nations 2014) 
Novak A, The Death Penalty in Africa: Foundations and Future Prospects (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2014) 
International Commission Against the Death Penalty, How States Abolish the Death 
Penalty: 29 Case Studies (2nd edn, 2018) 
Kannyo E, 'The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and Political 
116 
 
Background' in C. E. Welch Jr and R. I. Meltzer (eds.), Human Rights and Development 
in Africa  (Albany, State University of New York Press 1984) 
Karimunda AM, The Death Penalty in Africa: The Path Towards Abolition (Routledge 
2016) 
Klinghoffer AJ, The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda (New York, New 
York University Press, 1998) 
Malanczuk P, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn, New York, 
Routledge 1997) 
Mbaya E, ‘A la recherché du noyau intangible dans la Charte africaine’ in P Meyer-Bisch 
(ed), Le noyau intangible des Droits de l’homme (Fribourg Suisse1991) 
Novak A, Comparative Executive Clemency: The Constitutional Pardon Power and the 
Prerogative of Mercy in Global Perspective (Routledge 2016) 
– – The African Challenge to Global Death Penalty Abolition: International Human 
Rights Norms in Local Perspective (Intersentia 2016) 
Nowak M, ‘Is the death penalty an inhuman punishment?’ in TS Orlin, A Rosas & M 
Scheinin (eds) The jurisprudence of human rights law: A comparative interpretative 
approach (2000)  
Penal Reform International, Death Penalty Information Pack (2017) 
Perriello T and Wierda M, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny 
(International Center for Transitional Justice 2016) 
Prunier G, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1995) 
Sarat A, ‘Toward a New Perspective on Clemency in the Killing State’, in Charles S. 
Lanier et al. (eds), The Future of America’s Death Penalty (Carolina Academic Press 
2009). 
Schabas WA, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd edn, 
Cambridge, Grotius 2002) 
117 
 
Scheffer D, ‘Lessons from the Rwanda Genocide’ (2004) 5 Geo. J. Int'l Aff. 125 
Snell G S, Nandi Customary Law (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau 1954) 
Ouguergouz F, The African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights:  A Comprehensive 
Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy In Africa  (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2003) 
Umozurike O, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (M. Nijhoff Publishers 
1997) 
United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II (Part Two) 
(United Nations Publication 2007) 
United Nations, Treaty Handbook (United Nations Publications 2012) 
Voeten E, ‘Data and analysis of voting in the United Nations General Assembly’ in Bob 
Reinalda (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Organization (Routledge 2013). 
Yorke J, ‘The Evolving Human Rights Discourse of the Council of Europe: Renouncing 
Sovereign Right of the Death Penalty’ in Jon Yorke (eds) Against the Death Penalty: 
International Initiatives and Implications (Farnham Surrey, Ashgate, 2008) 
Cases  
Domestic: 
Benin Constitutional Court Decision DCC 12-153 of 4 August 2012 
Benin Constitutional Court Decision DCC 16-020 of 21 January 2016 
Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic [2017]  eKLR 
Jacob v. Republic (unreported) (Malawi) 
Kafantayeni v. Attorney-General, International Legal Materials, Vol. 46, No. 3 (May 
2007) 
Kigula and Others v The Attorney-General (2005) 197 AHRLR 
118 
 
Mejia v Attorney General, Action No 296 of 2000, Supreme Court of Belize, 11 June 
2001 
S v. Makwanyane and Another (1995) 3 SA 391 (CC) 
ThankGod Ebhos v Federal Republic of Nigeria (ECOWAS) (Unreported) 
The State v Moses Akatugba, Delta State High Court, Nigeria (Unreported) 
International: 
Boyce et al v Barbados, IACHR Series C no 169 
Edwards v The Bahamas, Report No. 48/01,4 April 2001 
Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al v Trinidad and Tobago, IACHR Series C no 9 
Jadhav Case (India v. Pakistan): Order on Provisional Measures (I.C.J.)” (2018) 57 
International Legal Materials 1 
Kindler v. Canada, CCPR Communication No. 470/1991 
Ng v. Canada , CCPR Communication No. 469/1991 
Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica  (1993) 4 All ER 769 
Prosecutor v Charles Taylor: Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, SCSL-2003-01-
1, ‘Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction’, Appeals Chamber, 31 May 2004  
Raxcacó-Reyes v Guatemala  IACtHR, 6 Feb. 2006 
Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (2007) 1 SACR 347 
(CC) 
Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
Domestic Legislation 
Benin Constitution 1990 
119 
 
Bill No 2014-035 on the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Madagascar) 
Compte Rendu du Conseil de Minstres, No. 08/2018/PR/SGG/CM/OJ/ORD, 21 Fevrier 
2018 
Constitution of Botswana 1966 
Constitution of Ghana 1957 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 
Constitution of Namibia 1990 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
Constitution of the Republic of Cape Verde 1981 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992 (as amended 1996) 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (as amended in 2010) 
Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
Constitution of Zambia 1991 (as amended in 1996, 2009 and 2016) 
Constitutional Revision Law No. 23/92 of 16 September 1992 on the Prohibition of the 
Death Penalty (Angola) 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 1927, Chapter 9:07, (as amended)(Zimbabwe) 
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993 
Kenya Penal Code 
Law no 2014-035 on the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Rwanda) 
Law No. 2012-15 of 18 March 2013 (Benin) 
Law No. 2012-15 of 18 March 2013 (Benin) 
120 
 
Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16/03/2007 Concerning the Transfer of Cases to the 
Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other 
States, Official Gazette Special No. 11 of March 19, 2007 (Rwanda) 
Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25/07/2007 relating to the abolition of the death penalty 
(Rwanda) 
Organic Law No. 8/96 of 30 August 1996, Official Gazette No. 17 of September 1, 1996. 
(Rwanda) 
Penal Code of Madagascar 2001 (as amended in 2005). 
Penal Code of Malawi 
Rwandan Penal Code 1978 
South Africa Criminal Law Amendment Act 1997 (Act No. 51 of 1977) 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 
International Tribunal Statutes and Rules 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda 1994 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 2002 
Journal Articles 
Alvarez JE, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’ (1999) 24 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 365 
Bennett N, ‘Christian and Negro Slavery in Eighteenth Century North Africa’ (1960) 1 
The Journal of African History 




Bojosi KN, ‘The death row phenomenon and the prohibition against torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment’ (2004) 4 AHRLJA 303 
Bouckaert PN, ‘Shutting Down the Death Factory: The Abolition of Capital Punishment 
in South Africa’ (1996) 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 287 
Edwards I, ‘An Ambiguous Participant: the Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-
Making’ (2004) 44 Brit. J. Criminal 967 
Crawford ML, ‘Losing Battle with the 'Machinery of Death': The Flaws of Virginia's 
Death Penalty Laws and Clemency Process Highlighted by the Fate of Teresa Lewis’ 
(2012) Volume 18 Widener Law Review 71 
Chenwi L, ‘Breaking new ground: The need for a protocol to the African Charter on the 
abolition of the death penalty in Africa’ (2005) 5 AHRLJ 89 
– – ‘Initiating Constructive Debate: Critical Reflection on the Death Penalty in Africa’ 
(2012) 38 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. 
Cryer R, ‘A "Special Court” for Sierra Leone?’ (2001) 50 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 435 
Erasmus G & Fourie N, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Are all issues 
addressed? How does it compare to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission?’ (1997) 321 International Review of the Red Cross 705. 
Freeland S, ‘No longer acceptable: the exclusion of the death penalty under international 
criminal law’ (2010) 15(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 1. 
Gittleman R, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’ 
(1982) 22:4 Virginia Journal of International Law 
Hannum H, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’ (1996) 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287   
Heyns C and Viljoen F, ‘The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
122 
 
Domestic Level’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 483 
Hood R and Hoyle C, ‘Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The Impact of a “New 
Dynamic”’ (2009) 38 Crime and Justice 1. 
Horovtiz S, ‘International Criminal Courts in Action: The ICTR’s Effect on Death 
Penalty and Reconciliation in Rwanda’ (2016) 48 The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 505 
Hudson P, ‘Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human Rights under 
International Law?’ (2000) 11  EJIL (2000) 833 
Keightley R, ‘Torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in the 
UN Convention against Torture and other instruments of international law: Recent 
developments in South Africa’ (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 400 
Kindiki K, ‘Prosecuting the Perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda: Its Basis in 
International Law and the Implications for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa’ 
(2001) 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 64 
Kinemo REJ, ‘Contemporary Tanzanian Penal Policy: A Critical Analysis’ (Naivasha: 
British Institute in East Africa) 
Klaasen A, ‘Constitutional Interpretation in the So-Called Hard Cases: Revisiting S v 
Makwanyane’ (2017) 50 De Jure 1 
Kodjo E, 'The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' (1990) 11 Human Rights 
Law Journal 271 
Manikis M , ‘Expanding participation: Victims as agents of accountability in the criminal 
justice process’ (2017) 1 Public Law 63 
Mireku O, ‘Shutting Down the Death Factory in South Africa: The Normative Role of 
the Twin Rights of Human dignity and Life’ 
<https://www.biicl.org/files/2312_mireku_shutting_down_death_factory.pdf > accessed 




Moffet L, ‘Meaningful and Effective? Considering Victims' Interests Through 
Participation at the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 26 Criminal Law Forum 255 
Mower AG, ‘The Sponsorship of Proposals in the United Nations General Assembly’ 
(1962) 15 Western Political Quarterly 661 
Mujuzi JD, ‘High Crime Rate Forces Liberia to Reintroduce the Death Penalty and put 
International Treaty Obligations Aside: What the Critics Missed’ (2009) 17 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. 342 
Neumayer E, ‘Death Penalty: The Political Foundations of the Global Trend Towards 
Abolition’ (2008) 9 Hum Rights Rev (2008) 241 
Novak A, ‘The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in Africa’ (2007) 22:2 IND. 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV 
Pascoe D, ‘Explaining Death Penalty Clemency in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
from 1986 to 2015’ (2016) 10 Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L. 168 
Patterson D and Tringali B, ‘Understanding How Advocates Can Affect Sexual Assault 
Victim Engagement in the Criminal Justice Process’ (2015) 30 Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence 1987 
Schaefer L, ‘Have Mercy: New Opportunities for Commutations in Death Penalty Cases’ 
(2016) 42 Human Rights Journal 18 
Shraga D and Zacklin R, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (1996) 7 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. 501 
Umozurike O, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights’ (1983) 77 The 
American Journal of International Law 902 
Van Zyl Smit D, ‘The death penalty in Africa’ (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 3 
Wemmers J, ‘Where Do They Belong? Giving Victims a Place in the Criminal Justice 
Process’ (2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 395 
124 
 
Newspaper and human rights organisation new articles 
Associated Press, ‘Burkina Faso abolishes death penalty in new penal code’ AP 
(Ouagadougou, 31 May 2018)    
<https://www.apnews.com/15b6e4f6a4a54af29e74e4e3d45a7bb6> accessed 25 June 
2018 
Amnesty International, ‘Fifty-three death sentences commuted in Zambia’ (16 January 
2009) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/01/fifty-three-death-sentences-
commuted-zambia-20090116/ > accessed 22 April 2018. 
Bah MJ, ‘Sierra Leone News: Death Sentence for Murderers’ Awoko (1 December 2017) 
<https://awoko.org/2017/12/08/sierra-leone-news-death-sentence-for-murderers/> 
accessed 25 June 2018 
Faul M, ‘Nigeria torture victim to be free after decade on death row’ AP (Lagos, 1 June 
2015)   <https://www.apnews.com/ca4298f61d9e48acbce77c8ecd97e83c> accessed 11 
September 2017. 
Gettleman J, ‘Kenya Spares the Lives of Everyone on Its Death Row’ The New York 
Times (24 October 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/world/africa/kenya-
kenyatta-death-penalty-reprieve.html > accessed 25 June 2018 
Kayode-Adedeji D, ‘Obasanjo reveals ‘saddest day’ of his life’ Premium Times (7 
January 2000) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/223539-obasanjo-
reveals-saddest-day-life.html> accessed 11 May 2018 
Matt Clarke, ‘4,000 Kenyan Death Sentences Commuted to Life’ Prison Legal News 
(December 2009) <https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2009/dec/15/4000-kenyan-
death-sentences-commuted-to-life/ > accessed 25 June 2018 
Olori T, ‘Rights-Nigeria: Death Row Convicts Pardoned’ Inter Press Service (7 January 
2000) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2000/01/rights-nigeria-death-row-convicts-pardoned/> 
accessed 14 April 2018 
World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, ‘4,000 death sentences commuted in Kenya’ 
125 
 
(6 August 2009) <http://www.worldcoalition.org/4000-death-sentences-commuted-in-
Kenya.html> accessed 11 September 2017 
Shosanya M, ‘Freedom for Thankgod Ebhos after 19 years on death row’ Daily Trust 
(Lagos, 21 October 2014) <http://thenationonlineng.net/pdps-call-for-national-
conference-insincere-says-fayemi/> accessed 11 September 2017 
The Death Penalty Project, ‘Kenya commutes the death sentences of more than 4,000 
prisoners’ (5 August 2009) <http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/news/1089/kenya-
commutes-the-death-sentences-of-more-than-4000-prisoners/> accessed 11 September 
2017 
Tumwebaze P, ‘Death row: Over 1300 survive gallows’ The New Times (27 August 2007) 
<http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/988> accessed 12 May 2018 
OAU Documents 
OAU, ‘Rapporteur’s Report on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 
OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt. Rpt (II) Rev. 4 
Organisation of African Unity, ‘Address delivered by President Leopold Sedar Senghor 
at the opening of the Meeting of African Experts preparing the draft African Charter in 
Dakar, Senegal 28 November to 8 December 1979’, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/5 
Organisation of African Unity, ‘Decision on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa’, 
AHG/Dec. 115 (XVI) Rev. 1 1979 
Organisation of African Unity, ‘Report on the Draft African Charter presented by the 
Secretary-General at the Thirty-seventh Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of 
Ministers’, OAU Doc CM/1149. 
Reports 
Conferences: 
Arnold M, ‘Remarks: Constitutional Development in Southern Africa’ (1991) 85 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 310) 
126 
 
International Commission of Jurist, African Conference on the Rule of Law, ‘A Report 
on the Proceedings of the Conference’ 11 (1961) 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Position Paper No. 2 on the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2007 
Malawi Law Commission, Discussion Paper No. 1, Human Rights under the Constitution 
of the Republic of Malawi 2 (2006) 
Seminar on the Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference to 
Africa (1969) 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs): 
Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries as of March 2018 (ACT 
50/6665/2017) 
– – Amnesty International submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review (AFR 
28/001/2008). 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2009 (ACT 50/001/2010) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2010 (ACT 50/001/2011) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2011 (ACT 50/001/2012) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2012 (ACT 50/001/2013) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2013 (ACT 50/001/2014) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2014 (ACT 50/001/2015); 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2015 (ACT 50/3487/2016)  
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2016 (ACT 50/5740/2017) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions 2017 (ACT 50/7955/2018) 
– – Death Sentences and Executions in 2008 (ACT 50/003/2009) 
127 
 
– – Fair Trial Manual (POL 30/002/2014, Second Edition, Amnesty International 
Publication 2014) 
– – 'Liberia: Amnesty International Calls for Repeal of Death Penalty Law Signed by 
Liberian President' (AFR 34/009/2008, 25 July 2008). 
– – Living in Limbo: Benin’s Last Death Row Prisoners (ACT 50/4980/2017) 
– – Locked Up and Forgotten: The Need to Abolish The Death Penalty in Ghana (ACT 
50/6268/2017) 
– – Nigeria: Time for justice and accountability (ACT AFR 44/014/2000) 
– – Rwanda: Suspects Must not be Transferred to Rwandan Courts for Trial Until it is 
Demonstrated that Trials will Comply with International Standards of Justice, (AFR 
47/013/2007) 
– – The Death Penalty (London, Amnesty International 1979)  
– – West Africa: Time to abolish the death penalty (AFR 05/003/2003) 
Death Penalty Worldwide, Pathways to Abolition of the Death Penalty (Cornell Law 
School, 2016) 
Zorah Blok and Ciarán Suter, Triggers for abolition of the death penalty in Africa: A 
Southern African perspective (FIDH, 2017) 
Parliamentary:  
Parliament of Zimbabwe, Report of the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (on 
the new Constitution for Zimbabawe) (COPAC 2013). 
Treaties, and other international human rights law instruments 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36 
128 
 
Arab Charter on Human Rights 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
ETS No 5 
General Comment No. 14: Article 6 (Right to Life) Nuclear Weapons and the Right to 
Life, on 9 November 1984 
General Comment on Article 6, General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), 30 
April 1982 
Human Rights Committee (CCPR), Draft General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of 
ICCPR, on the right to life (Advance Unedited Version), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3 
Mbaye Draft of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/1 
Preliminary draft of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 1. 
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, ETS No.187 
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ETS No. 114 
Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa 
Safeguard 7 of the UN Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing 
the Death Penalty, UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1984/50 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, 1642 UNTS 414 
129 
 
UNGA Resolution 65/206 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217A (III) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 115 UNTS 332 
UN Documents 
UN Doc A/67/279, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 9 August 2012 
UN Doc A/HRC/14/13/Add.1, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review – Madagascar - Addendum, 17 June 2010 
UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions - Philip Alston, 28 May 2010 
UN Doc A/HRC/22/13, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
– Zambia, 31 December 2012 
UN Doc A/HRC/24/15, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
– Cameroon, 5 July 2013 
UN Doc A/HRC/28/13, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
– Madagascar, 23 December 2014 
UN doc A/RES/62/149, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 
2007- 62/149 Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, 26 February 2008 
UN Doc A/RES/63/168, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 
2008 - 63/168 Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, 13 February 2009 
UN Doc A/RES/65/206, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 
2010 - 65/206. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, 28 March 2011 
UN Doc A/RES/67/176, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 
2012 - 67/176. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, 20 March 2013 
UN Doc A/RES/69/186, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 
130 
 
2014 - 69/186. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, 4 February 2015 
UN Doc A/RES/71/187, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 
2016 - 71/187. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, 2 February 2017 
UN Doc CCPR/ C/ 77/D/1077/2002, Human Rights Committee Views, Communication 
No. 1077/2002, 15 May 2003 
UN Doc CCPR/C/70/D/806/1998, Human Rights Committee Views, Communication 
No. 806/1998, 5 December 2000 
UN Doc CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998, Human Rights Committee Views, Communication 
No. 845/1998, 28 March 2002 
UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1132/2002, Human Rights Committee Views, Communication 
No. 1132/2002, 11 November 2005 
UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1421/2005, Human Rights Committee Views, Communication 
No. 1421/2005, 14 September 2006 
UN Doc CCPR/C/98/D/1520/2006, Human Rights Committee Views, Communication 
No. 1520/2006, 30 April 2010 
UN Doc CCPR/C/BWA/CO/1, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee 
– Botswana, 24 April 2008 
UN Doc CCPR/C/GHA/1, Initial reports of States Parties due in 2001 – Ghana, 30 
January 2015 
UN Doc CCPR/C/KEN/CO/3, Concluding observations adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee at its 105th session, 9-27 July 2012 – Kenya, 31 August 2012 
UN Doc CCPR/C/ZAF/1, Initial reports of States parties due in 2000 – South Africa, 16 
February 2015 
UN Doc CCPR/C/ZMB/3, Third periodic report of States parties due in 1998 – Zambia, 
25 April 2006 
131 
 
UN Doc CCPR/C/ZMB/CO/3, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee 
– Zambia, 9 August 2007 
UN Doc CCPR/CO/80/UGA, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee 
– Uganda, 4 May 2004 
UN Doc CCPR/CO/83/KEN, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee 
– Kenya, 29 April 2005 
UN doc E/2015/49, Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards 
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, Report of the 
Secretary-General, 13 April 2015 
UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/59, The Question of the Death Penalty, UN Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 2005/59, 20 April 2005 
UN Doc S/PV.3453, United Nations Security Council 3453rd Meeting, 8 November 1994 
UN Doc S/Res/1315, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315, 14 August 2000 
UN Doc S/RES/1503, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503, 28 August 2003 
UN Doc S/RES/1534, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1534, 26 March 2004 
UN Doc S/RES/955, United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, 8 November 1994  
UN Doc ST/TAO/HR/39, Seminar on the Regional Commissions on Human Rights with 
Special Reference to Africa (1969) 
Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, Facts Sheet No 15 (Rev. 1). 
UN Doc A/HRC/10/44, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment -Manfred Nowak, 14 January 2009 
UN Doc A/C.3/49/SR.43, Summary record of the 14th meeting: 3rd Committee, UN 
General Assembly 19th Session, 1 November 1994 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/68, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions - Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, 23 December 1997 
132 
 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/9, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions - Ms. Asma Jahangir, 11 January 2001 
UN Doc S/2003/946, Letter dated 3 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 6 October 2003. 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/7, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions - Philip Alston, 22 December 2004 
UN Doc S/2006/951, Letter dated 30 November 2006 from the President of the 
International Criminal Tribunal addressed to the President of the Security Council, 8 
December 2006 
UN Doc A/HRC/24/2, Report of the Human Rights Council on its twenty-fourth session, 
27 January 2014 
UN Doc A/HRC/25/2, Report of the Human Rights Council on its twenty-fifth session, 
17 July 2014 
UN Doc A/HRC/4/20, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions - Philip Alston, 29 January 2007 
UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/20/MDG/1, National report submitted in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21– Madagascar, 23 
July 2014 
UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/20/MDG/2, Compilation prepared by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to 
Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 
16/21 – Madagascar, 18 August 2014 
UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/20/MDG/3, Summary prepared by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of 
the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to 
Council resolution 16/21 – Madagascar, 5 August 2014 
UN Doc A/HRC/22/6, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – 
133 
 
Ghana, 13 December 2012 
UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/28/BEN/1, National report submitted in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21– Benin, 7 August 
2017 
UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/28/ZMB/1, National report submitted in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21– Zambia, 26 October 
2017 
UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/7/MDG/1, National report submitted in accordance with 
paragraph 15 (a) of the Annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1- Madagascar, 3 
November 2009 
UN Doc A/HRC/23/7, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – 
Botswana, 22 March 2013 
UN Doc A/HRC/11/21/Add.1, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review -  Cameroon - Addendum, 9 June 2009 
Websites 
African Union:  
<https://au.int/en/memberstates> 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 








Archive of the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone: 
<http://www.scsldocs.org/> 
Death Penalty Project: 
<http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/where-we-operate/africa/malawi/> 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: 
< https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Taylor.pdf> 
Government of Kenya: 
<http://www.statelaw.go.ke/task-force-on-death-penalty-commences-assignment/> 
Malawi Law Commission: 
<http://www.lawcom.mw/docs/discussion_paperl-human%20rights.pdf> 






















William Schabas Blog: 




< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z0BtxvkUpcM>  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
